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Abstract
This dissertation examines the impacts of distance-dependent spatial externalities on
patterns of economic activity in a free-market setting. This class of externalities, which in-
clude such examples as smog dispersal, pesticide drift, and habitat degradation from roads,
are referred to as “edge-effect externalities”. Under edge-effect externalities, economic op-
timality will require not only the correct allocation of land to different uses, but also the
correct arrangement of land uses. However, an unregulated free market will potentially fail
to achieve an efﬁcient arrangement of land uses.
Chapter 2 develops a spatially continuous one-dimensional model of edge-effect exter-
nalities. Themodel demonstrates that, while the externality creates an incentive forarecipi-
enttodistance himselffromthegenerator, thisdistance istoosmallfromasocial standpoint.
Themodel also demonstrates the potential forpositive externalities between those impacted
by the edge-effect externality.
Chapter 3formallydemonstrates the potential foredge-effect externalities tocreate non-
convexities in the production possibilities frontier. Further, it demonstrates that conﬂicting
border per unit area is a summary measure of landscape efﬁciency under edge-effect exter-
nalities, but this ratio will vary with the number, shape, and geographic concentration of2
parcels in the externality-receiving use.
Chapter 4 develops a two dimensional agent-based cellular automaton model of free-
marketland useinaneconomy impacted byedge-effect externalities. Itdemonstrates thatin
anunregulated free-market without bargaining, both Pareto-efﬁcient and inefﬁcient equilib-
rium landscape patterns are possible. Initial conﬁgurations of ﬁrms, permanent geographic
features, and transportation costs will impact ﬁnal outcomes.
Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis that production patterns for California Certiﬁed Organic
Farms reﬂect possible avoidance of negative spatial spillovers from surrounding conven-
tional farms. Differences inparcel size, shape, andsurroundingsbetween C.C.O.F.andnon-
C.C.O.F.parcels aredemonstrated. Whileinherently morevulnerable tolossesfrommanda-
tory buffer zones, C.C.O.F.parcels are shown topotentially lose amuchlower proportion of
their land to buffers than non-C.C.O.F. parcels. However, very few C.C.O.F. farms border
C.C.O.F. farms under separate management, indicating that growers have not managed to
coordinate to capture potential positive externalities.
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4.6 A fragmented landscape under externalities leads to an efﬁcient outcome
￿ 75
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Many classic examples of externalities are inherently spatial: emissions from industrial
smokestacks that decrease air quality for surrounding residents, release of efﬂuent from a
riverside factory that negatively impacts water quality for downstream users, and invasion
of a farmer’s ﬁeld by a neighbor’s cattle. Such examples are often used to illustrate the con-
cept of an economic externality and to motivate the theoretical effectiveness of mitigation
measures such as Pigovian taxes, liability rules, and bargaining between affected parties.
Yet, models used to demonstrate externality impacts generally do not explicitly account for
space [21, 3].
Not only are these classic examples inherently spatial, but they also exhibit distance de-
pendence, with damaging impacts decreasing as the distance from the pollution source in-
creases. This distance dependence implies that damages from the externality are spatially
heterogeneous. Explicit recognition of this spatial heterogeneity raises new questions be-2
yondthose previously addressed bytheexternality literature. First, whatlocation incentives
are created by this class of externalities? Second, what impact does this spatial heterogene-
ity have on the potential productivity of the economic landscape? Third, will the incentives
created by these externalities necessarily lead to economically efﬁcient patterns of produc-
tion? Finally, what does spatial heterogeneity imply for the design and potential effective-
ness of policy interventions?
Ecological Edge Effects The characteristics of distance-dependent externalities such as
those described above have much in common with the concept of an “edge-effect” devel-
oped in the ecology literature [15, 39, 28, 16, 40]. In keeping with this parallel, these ex-
ternalities are titled “edge-effect externalities”. The ecological term “edge effect” refers to
ecosystem degradation that occurs at the borders between differing habitat patches [15, 39,
28, 16, 40]. A key feature of an edge effect is that degrading impacts, such as foreign plant
species and predator migration, decline as distance from the border increases. This fea-
ture implies that the arrangement and shape, as well as the total area distribution, of habitat
patches become important for landscape management. Speciﬁcally, under ecological edge
effects, habitat fragmentation leads to non-linear declines in intact interior habitat.
On an ecological level, the pattern and shape of economic land uses matter because the
economic and ecological landscape are jointly determined. Economists have begun to rec-
ognize their role in predicting land use pattern and shape to provide critical modeling inputs
forlandscape ecologists. Geoghegan, Bockstael, Bell, andIrwindiscusstheseissues,noting3
that ecological models have traditionally imposed, rather than modeled, economic patterns
of land use [12] . This approach, they argue, fails to capture the interrelationships between
economic and ecological landscapes. If the spatial expansion of economic activity signiﬁ-
cantly fragments the ecological landscape, it will contribute in a non-linear way to habitat
loss.
In fact, habitat degradation caused by landscape fragmentation can be viewed as a spe-
ciﬁcexample ofthebroadclassofedge-effect externalities. Further, justasscale andpattern
of habitat matter for species diversity and survival under ecological edge effects, under eco-
nomic edge effects, scale and pattern of activity have implications for economic efﬁciency.
Speciﬁcally, fragmentation oftheeconomiclandscape canleadtonon-linear declines inpro-
duction possibilities.
Initial intuition might suggest that relatively lower values of land impacted by negative
spillovers should encourage development of efﬁcient patterns of land use. Empirical ev-
idence suggests that the impact of both proximity to conﬂicting uses and landscape frag-
mentation are reﬂected in property values [5, 12, 13, 29, 22]. However, since externalities
are present, the value of organizing land uses so as to create an efﬁcient production land-
scape will notbereﬂected inland prices. Thissuggests that market forces donotnecessarily
lead to efﬁcient patterns of production.
Modeling Goals This dissertation undertakes a systematic investigation of the impacts of
edge-effect externalities on the economic landscape with the ultimate goal of understand-4
ing the impacts of edge-effect externalities on free-market land use patterns. In addition to
providing theoretical insights regarding the landscape impacts of edge-effect externalities,
a primary goal of this work is to develop a theoretical model that generates predictions con-
ducive to testing with actual spatial data. Spatial heterogeneity results not only from edge-
effect externalities but also from other economic factors such as transportation costs and
variations in land quality. The model, therefore, must be able to account for these factors
and produce spatially heterogeneous, disaggregated predictions. Second, economic land-
scapes are constantly evolving and are characterized by spatial and temporal dynamic com-
plexity. Theeconomic landscape maynever reach astable spatial equilibrium, and different
development paths may lead to different equilibria. An effective model should therefore il-
lustrate the dynamics of land use change, as well as possible spatial equilibria. Complex
environments are often characterized by non-convexities and multiple equilibria, implying
that a solution for the dynamic path and equilibrium outcome may be difﬁcult to obtain via
traditional optimization techniques. Therefore, the model should employ a solution method
that succeeds under a high degree of heterogeneity and interdependency. Finally, the struc-
ture and scale of model predictions should ideally match the structure and scale of available
spatial data.
Chapters 2 through 4 of the dissertation presents a series of theoretical models which
both illustrate potential welfare losses due to edge-effect externalities and develop spatially
explicit hypotheses forempirical testing. Chapter2presentsasimpleone-dimensional model
that illustrates the individual incentives created by edge-effect externalities. This model is5
also used to illustrate the spatial aspects of potential market failure under edge-effect ex-
ternalities, the potential effectiveness of traditional policy interventions that explicitly ac-
count for spatially heterogeneous damages, and the spatial mechanism of Coasean bargain-
ing. The model is also used to illustrate positive externalities between externality recipients
and to motivate the possibility that free-market patterns of production may not maximize
aggregate production possibilities.
The potential for edge-effect externalities to induce non-convexities in the production
possibilities frontier is formally illustrated in Chapter 3. Further, impacts of edge-effect ex-
ternalities that are revealed only in a two-dimensional framework are illustrated. The chap-
teralsointroduces spatial statistics thatreﬂecttherelative efﬁciency ofeconomiclandscapes
under edge-effect externalities.
Chapter 4 presents a two-dimensional cellular automaton model that demonstrates that
free-market production patterns may be sub-optimal. Although economic landscapes may
be locally efﬁcient, they may also exhibit inefﬁcient global fragmentation, and rearrange-
ments of production may be welfare improving. In the model, land use decisions are made
independently by owners of individual parcels, each taking the actions of neighbors and
market parameters as given. A solution to the competitive equilibrium is reached through
decentralized dynamic evolution of the economic landscape. Thus, potential difﬁculties
inherent in solving for an economic equilibrium under substantial non-convexities are by-
passed. Further, equilibrium outcomes are measurable both in terms oftraditional measures
of economic welfare and in terms of spatial statistics related to landscape pattern, laying the6
groundwork for testing of model hypotheses using real-world data. While it is beyond the
scope of this dissertation to develop and calibrate a model to be tested explicitly using data
on actual landscapes, the model demonstrates the feasibility of such an approach.
Edge Effects in California Agriculture Many examples of land-use conﬂicts in Central
Valley agriculture can be characterized in terms of edge effect externalities. They reﬂect a
range of institutional structures, liability rules, and mitigation measures. In addition to tra-
ditional policy interventions, negotiation between affected parties, mandatory buffer zones,
and whole-landscape planning are important tools for managing potential conﬂicts.
Since the early 1990s, cotton production has been reintroduced to the Northern Central
Valley, facilitated bynewvarieties that tolerate ashorter growing season. Conﬂicts between
cotton farmers and rice farmers quickly developed after rice farmers reverted to the use of
broad-spectrum pheonoxy herbicides. The switch occurred after weeds which plagued rice
ﬁelds developed resistance to Londax, the previously used herbicide. Many crops are sen-
sitive to pheonoxies, but cotton is hyper sensitive. Any contamination causes serious dam-
age. By 1996, county regulations were instituted by the Glenn and Colusa County Agri-
cultural Commissions to attempt to prevent damage. These restrictions initially included
buffer zones for pheonoxy use and aerial spray restrictions. However, because of the high
driftpotential andextremesensitivity ofcotton, theserestrictions werenotcompletely effec-
tive. Zoning restrictions were considered but rejected. After lawsuits were ﬁled by affected
cotton growers, herbicide producers demanded complete restrictions onaerial pheonoxy ap-7
plications in affected areas to protect themselves from litigation [10, 27, 9].
In Glenn County, a potential conﬂict between olive growers and cotton producers has
been mitigated by the creation of a cotton growing zone. Cotton is a potential verticillium
wilt carrier. This fungus can cause serious and permanent damage to olives, which con-
stitute a major crop in Glenn county. A committee appointed by the County Board of Su-
pervisors, which included representatives from the cotton growers, the olive growers, and
representatives from the Board itself, drafted and adopted a county regulation which pro-
hibits cotton production in much of the county. The result is in effect a “cotton zone” in
the Southwest corner of the county. Buffer zones were considered but rejected. This was
apparently an extremely emotional conﬂict, but seems to have been resolved successfully
through the zoning arrangement [9].
Inordertosuccessfully producehybridseeds,growersmustensurethatnosimilarspecies
are grown in close enough proximity to cross-pollinate with the hybrid crops. Seeds pro-
duced by contracted growers must meet high standards of uniformity, otherwise the en-
tire crop will be rejected. To prevent cross-pollination, coordination occurs at many levels.
Seed companies attempt to assign contracts in a geographically coordinated fashion to min-
imize potential conﬂicts between growers, impose and monitor mandatory buffers between
similar crops, and supply household gardeners with seeds in return for agreements not to
grow certain varieties. Growers meet annually to negotiate agreements with their neigh-
bors to coordinate planting decisions and ensure that buffer zone requirements imposed by
seed companies are met.8
Edge Effects in Organic Agriculture Many conventional farming practices have spa-
tial spillovers that are incompatible with organic or sustainable production. Pesticide drift
is the most obvious example. Other examples are more subtle. Monoculture and lack of
habitat may result in decreased populations of beneﬁcial predators and pollinators. An or-
ganic grower may suffer crop damage when harmful insects migrate from a neighbor’s plot,
and the organic grower cannot use pesticides to control the unwanted populations. The pos-
sibility of contamination by genetically modiﬁed organisms through cross-pollination has
become an acute concern to organic producers. While liability for pesticide drift legally
rests with the party applying the pesticides, under California Certiﬁed Organic Farming
(C.C.O.F.)regulations, organicproducersarenevertheless required toensurea25footbuffer
between organic land and land under potentially incompatible uses.
Ininterviews withbothcertiﬁed andnon-certiﬁed organicgrowers,twopointshavestood
out. First, geographic features play an important role for growers in terms of providing pro-
tection for their land. Many growers have commented on the beneﬁts of a location such as
the Capay Valley, where natural protection isprovided byhills andCache Creek, asopposed
to an unprotected Central Valley location. Properties also often utilize hedgerows and tree
windbreaks to provide both protection and habitat for beneﬁcials insects, even when grow-
ers are not certiﬁed and are therefore not required to impose buffers.
Second, many organic growers report that good relations with their conventional neigh-
bors have allowed them to mitigate conﬂicts. When buffer zones are required, some grow-
ers report imposing them on their own land, while others report that conventional neighbors9
maintained the buffers themselves. One grower stressed that in his opinion, the key to suc-
cessful sustainable production was to be a part of a community of small farmers, regardless
of their growing practices.
The case of the organic growers offers particular promise for empirical analysis. First,
results related to the organic industry hold promise for lasting policy relevance. Due to fun-
damental differences in production practices between organic and conventional agriculture,
conﬂicts will persist over time. Further, demand for organic products continues to expand
in both domestic and international markets, so the viability of organic production is likely
to be an issue of long-term importance. Since organic products are required to be free from
genetically modiﬁed organisms, consumers concerned about G.M.O.’s may choose to pur-
chase organic products, further expanding demand.
Second, buffer zone requirements have been in place since 1990, and will remain an im-
portant aspect of certiﬁcation new proposed national organic standards [36]. These buffer
zones requirements provide concrete, measurable evidence of the impacts of edge-effect
externalities.
￿
Further, the buffer zones are quite small in comparison to the size of or-
ganic parcels, implying that the most important spatial spillovers will occur froman organic
grower’s immediate neighbors. This results signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes empirical analysis of
neighborhood effects.
Substantial ﬁxed costs of relocation contribute to the possibility that free-market pat-
ternsoforganicproduction maynotbemostefﬁcient. Certiﬁed organicplotsmustgothrough
￿
The C.C.O.F.regulations require 25 foot buffers if there is “any concernabout the possibility of contam-
ination from adjacent areas” [7]. In 1997, 58% of C.C.O.F. growers were required to maintain at least one
buffer zone, and of these growers, only 33% were able to sell crops grown in these buffer areas.10
a three year transition phase before crops can be sold under a certiﬁed organic label. Thus,
once production is established successfully in a given location, it is often not cost effective
to relocate.
Last, but perhaps most important for successful empirical analysis, the data available to
study California Certiﬁed Organic Farmers are excellent. Certiﬁcation records are moni-
tored each year to ensure that records are complete and coherent. Parcel map requirements
are standardized, and street addresses and location descriptions are provided, so that the lo-
cations of parcels can successfully identiﬁed. Inspector’s reports contain detailed descrip-
tions of surrounding land uses and buffer zone requirements. While the population of cer-
tiﬁed growers in the region of analysis is small, the high quality of the available data offer
inspire conﬁdence in the validity of the results of this empirical analysis.
￿
Chapter 5 provides in-depth analysis of potential conﬂicts between California Certiﬁed
Organic Farms and their conventional neighbors. Theoretical predictions outlined in Chap-
ters 2 and 4 are evaluated through empirical analysis of locations and production patterns
of C.C.O.F. farms in a two-county region of California’s Central Valley. Data for this anal-
ysis come from a geographic information system constructed for the purposes of this study.
The G.I.S. contains detailed information on crops grown and soil types for all agricultural
parcels in each county. Further, parcel boundaries and buffer zone requirements are iden-
tiﬁed for C.C.O.F. parcels. This dataset facilitates a unique analysis of organic production
landscapes. Comparisons of a series of landscape statistics for certiﬁed organic and non-
￿
An ideal data set for this two-county region would also have included location of non-certiﬁed organic
farms. Unfortunately, data on locations of registered organic farms are not available for research purposes.
Data on C.C.O.F. farms were obtained under a detailed set of conﬁdentiality conditions.11
certiﬁed organic parcels demonstrate signiﬁcant differences between parcels consistent with
avoidance of potential conﬂicts with conventional agriculture by certiﬁed organic farmers.
These results demonstrate that avoidance ofbuffer zones is an important factor in determin-
ing locations and production patterns for C.C.O.F. farmers. The results also indicate that
organic growers may be willing to pay a premium for crop land in protected locations. This
price premium may constitute a barrier to entry into certiﬁed organic production, resulting




Spatial externalities are a common feature of economic landscapes and have a signif-
icant inﬂuence on the evolution of land use patterns. Standard externality theory tells us
that without mitigation or bargaining, free-market land use allocations will not be Pareto
optimal – too much land will be dedicated to harmful uses and too little land to beneﬁcial
uses. Undermanysigniﬁcant spatial externalities, however, anadditional dimensiontomar-
ket failure is possible – the free market will not achieve an efﬁcient spatial conﬁguration of
land uses.
In many spatial externalities, negative externality impacts are most intense at the bor-
der with a generating land use, and damages decline in severity as distance from the of-
fending land use increases. Examples include intrusion of noise, odors, and pollutants from13
industrial sites into residential areas, degradation of habitat reserves due to surrounding de-
velopment, drift of agricultural pesticides into urban areas, and spillovers of criminal ac-
tivity from dangerous neighborhoods. Under these “edge-effect externalities,” optimality
requires not only the appropriate allocation of land to differing uses, but the appropriate ar-
rangement of land uses. Speciﬁcally, an arrangement of production sites that minimizes po-
tentially conﬂicting borders will be most efﬁcient. Many regulatory tools to address spatial
externalities are available to policy makers. However, to date, the impact of these policies
on land-use patterns has not been considered. This deﬁcit motivates an important new re-
searchquestion: howeffectively willpotential mitigation measures,whichinclude Pigovian
taxes, liability rules, mandatory buffer zones, and zoning laws, encourage development of
economically optimal patterns of land use? To answer this question, a comprehensive un-
derstanding of the incentives created by edge-effect externalities for an individual land user
is needed.
Thischapterpresentsaone-dimensional, spatially continuousandspatially dynamicthe-
oretical model designed to illustrate these incentives. The problem is modeled in the con-
text of land use conﬂicts between organic and conventional agricultural producers. First,
socially optimal and purely competitive outcomes are examined under the assumption of
efﬁcient land-use arrangement, with like uses grouped together and maximal spatial sepa-
ration between incompatible uses. The potential for spatially explicit Pigovian taxes, liabil-
ity rules, and Coasean bargaining to achieve socially optimal land use allocation is demon-
strated. Theassumption of efﬁcient arrangement of land uses is then relaxed to demonstrate14
the production impacts of land use fragmentation, to discuss the role of potential positive
externalities between externality recipients, and to examine the potential for market equi-
libria in which compatible land uses remain geographically separated.
Threeimportant results areemphasized. First, theexternality creates anincentive forthe
recipient to distance himself from the generator, resulting in an individually optimal buffer
zone. However, this incentive does not imply that the free-market outcome will coincide
with the social optimum since the individually optimal buffer is smaller than is socially op-
timal. Second, ceteris paribus, economic efﬁciency requires spatial agglomeration (equiv-
alent to minimal landscape fragmentation) of affected users. Third, incentives for affected
users to agglomerate may be imperfect due to the possibility of mutual but asymmetric pos-
itive externalities. These results imply that an unregulated free market may not lead to ef-
ﬁcient patterns of land use. Further, they motivate an investigation of the impacts of policy
interventions, such as taxation, liability rules, buffer zones, and zoning laws on land use
patterns, as well as on the total allocation of land to various uses.
2.1.1 A Brief Literature Review
The potential for tradable permits to achieve a least-cost allocation of emissions in an
economy with distance-dependent pollution dispersion has been examined by several au-
thors [26, 20, 25]. These works recognize the importance of spatial spillovers when eval-
uating the potential for tradable permit schemes to achieve least-cost pollution abatement
by explicitly accounting for spatially heterogeneous damages. However, they take both the15
optimal level of pollution output and the optimal location of polluting ﬁrms and of poten-
tialrecipients asgiven. Theﬁrstassumptionisstandardforcost-minimization schemes. The
second represents afailure to consider optimization in the land-use arrangement dimension,
since the possibility that externality recipients may relocate in response to local changes in
emissions levels is not considered.
Thischapterisprecededbyseveralimportant spatially discretemodelswithassumptions
consistent with edge-effect externalities that begin to address optimal ﬁrm location [4, 17,
1]. Baumol and Oates note that spatial externalities can potentially lead to non-convexities
in aggregate production possibilities and that non-convexities can be mitigated by spatial
separation of conﬂicting production processes. Helfand and Rubin characterize this sep-
aration solution as a “corner solution” and discuss the circumstances in which separation
may be socially optimal. Albers examines optimal management decisions within a discrete
spatial model consistent with the existence of edge effect externalities. Consistent with ex-
pectations, when spatial externalities are accounted for, it is optimal to group habitat cells
and other complementary land uses. Someinsight islost in these models due to the spatially
discrete modeling. Economically optimal distancing strategies, the possible emergence of
voluntary buffer zones, and changes in optimal distances and buffers due to changes in eco-
nomic conditions are not easily analyzed in a discrete setting.
Kanemoto reviews the early urban economics literature examining continuous spatial
externalities with diminishing marginal impacts [18]. Models that focus on conﬂicts be-
tween an industrial and residential sector provide insight on the optimal location of a bor-16
der between an externality generating activity and externality recipients. Models are based
on a two-dimensional monocentric city in a featureless plain, but outcomes can be com-
pletely described in terms of a one-dimensional radius. Two important general results are
highlighted. First, the rent gradient may be increasing with distance from the industrial /
residential border if negative externality impacts outweigh the beneﬁts of proximity. Sec-
ond, if the externality is severe enough, a buffer zone between the industrial and residential
zones may be socially optimal. This literature, in general, focuses only on socially optimal
outcomes given an efﬁcient arrangement of land uses.
Several authors [34, 11, 35] have analyzed the potential for spatial Pigovian taxes to
achieve a socially optimal allocation of economic activity under spatial externalities with
declining marginal damages. Tomasi and Weise, in the context of a spatially continuous
one-dimensional model, demonstrate that under certain externality generation conditions,
spatial Pigovian taxes can induce both the appropriate intensity of externality-generating
production and the socially optimal location of a boundary between conﬂicting uses. These
spatial pigovian taxes prove extraordinarily complex, as they depend on information on
shadow values of land at differing points in space. They therefore cannot be viewed as a
practical policy mechanism. Further, spatially heterogeneous taxes are notcommoninprac-
tice. The mostcommon policy responses include zoning rules, mandatory buffer zones, and
legal liability for damages. These mitigation mechanisms may well offer a more practical
and cost-efﬁcient way ofencouraging optimal arrangement ofland uses. However, a formal
analysis of these policies is absent from the literature.17
Thischapter develops a simple three-producer model of edge-effect externalities appro-
priate for evaluating the market responses of affected parties to liability rules, mandatory
buffers, and zoning regulations. The focus is on a more comprehensive understanding of
free-market outcomes and the possible dimensions of market failure than has been provided
in the previous literature, with particular emphasis on illustrating the spatial dimension of
standard results and policy interventions. In particular, a spatial interpretation is provided
for standard results related to the failure of the free market to equate marginal social bene-
ﬁts and costs, the difference in ﬁrm outputs and total externality damage between the social
optimum and free-market outcome, and the operation of Pigovian taxes, liability rules, and
Coasean bargaining.
This exposition serves several purposes. First, it provides a needed framework for un-
derstanding theincentives createdbydistance-dependent spatialexternalities. Second,since
spatial separation of potentially conﬂicting uses is assumed, production possibilities in the
land use dimension are maximized, given the externality. This model therefore outlines a
minimum degree of market failure under edge-effect externalities and provides a bench-
mark for measuring additional market failure that may occur due to landscape fragmen-
tation. Further, by describing individual incentives along any given border, it provides a
needed building block for two-dimensional spatial models. Two-dimensional models are
arguably most appropriate to test the landscape pattern impacts of both traditional policy
interventions, such as taxes and liability rules, and alternative measures common in prac-
tice, such as mandatory buffer zones and zoning laws.18
2.2 A Simple Model
2.2.1 Land-use Arrangement
Total land available for production is represented by a line of length
￿
. Three land uses
are possible: production of organic agriculture (O), conventional agriculture (C), and an
alternative use (A), which could represent grazing land, natural vegetation, or some simi-
lar use. Organic production is negatively impacted by an externality generated by the con-
ventional producer. The magnitude of potential externality damage declines with increased
distance from the conventional producer’s border. The alternative use is assumed to be un-
affected by any externality and to not positively nor negatively impact marginal external-
ity damage.
￿
In this model, the most efﬁcient arrangement of land uses is imposed, with
the alternative use located between the organic and conventional sites. An interpretation is
that zoning rules are in place to separate incompatible uses. However, the length of the line
segment occupied by each user is determined endogenously. Since decisions are spatially
interdependent, it also implies that the location of shared borders and distance between land
users are endogenous to the model. Thisfacilitates acomparison of the socially optimal and
free-market equilibrium distance between incompatible uses.
Locations of land uses are illustrated in Figure 2.1. The total amount of land occupied
by each grower is deﬁned by the difference between the upper and lower extensive margin
￿
Theserelationships between organic production, conventionalproduction, and alternative land uses rep-
resent simplifying assumptions. The argument can be made that conventionalproducers experiencenegative
spilloversfrom organicneighbors,andin somecases,alternativeusessuchasnaturalvegetationmayenhance
the productivity of surrounding organic farms.19

















































￿ represents the shared border between the alternative and conven-
tional use. The amount of land in the alternative use therefore deﬁnes the distance between
the organic and conventional borders.










Figure 2.1: Land Use Locations: Interior Solutions
2.2.2 Production
For simplicity, land (
￿ ) is assumed to be the single input to the production process. This
single input represents a composite of soil and labor inputs. Soil quality is assumed to be
homogeneous over all available land. Production takes place on all land rented.20
The Conventional Producer The conventional ﬁrm experiences diminishing returns to
land as afactor of production and imposesa negative externality on the organic ﬁrm
￿
. Since
the amount of land she occupies increases as
￿












































is the marginal product function,
￿
is a









￿ . Since land quality is as-
sumed to be homogeneous, as long as she can occupy her optimal amount of land, C is in-
different about what production site she occupies. Further, an additional unit of production
along either border would be equally valuable to her.
TheOrganic Producer Theorganic producer experiences alossofproduction at themar-
gin due to the presence of the conventional farmer that diminishes with the distance from
C’s production edge, the generation point of the externality damage. In this simple model,
the severity of the externality depends only on O’s distance from C, and not on the amount
￿
A justiﬁcation for the assumptionof diminishing returns could be that the farmer must monitor eachpart
oftheﬁelddaily, andgivenlimited hoursto allocate,thequalityofhermonitoring will decreaseastheamount
of land she has to monitor increases. An additional justiﬁcation could be that the conventional farmer incurs
distance-dependenttransportation costs to market, while the organic farmer sells his produce on site.
￿
Representingthisfunctiongraphicallyinaspatialcontextpresentssomedifﬁculties,sincefortheconven-
tional producer, an additional unit of land at any point in space should have the same marginal product since
production possibilities are spatially homogeneous. As a compromise, the graphs are drawn so that marginal
products at each border are equal.21
of land occupied by C. The marginal damage at each point in space is represented as the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(production loss / land unit)




















Figure 2.2: The Marginal Externality Damage Function
Asaspeciﬁcexample, letthepotential marginalproduction losstoOdecline linearly and
be equal to









￿ represents the maximal damage possible
fromtheexternality. Theproduction lossdeclines linearly asdistance fromtheconventional
border increases with slope
￿




assumed to hold values so that there will be an interior point where O may produce free
from the externality. This point will be reached at the








. The damage function is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
O is assumed to operate according to a constant returns to land technology in the region
where theexternality impact isnotpresent. Speciﬁcally, marginal productivity onanygiven
unit of land is equal to
￿ . While this is not consistent with the speciﬁcation for C, it allows
for a clear demonstration of key results – in particular, the fact that the spatial externality
will impose distance-dependent diminishing marginal productivity on O’s production pos-
sibilities ifnonewere present before. Thisproduction result leads to thepossible emergence22
of a buffer between the organic and conventional producer. The implications derived from
this model generalize to one where O also operates under diminishing returns.
Organic Producer
Conventional Producer
Land Occupied by 
eo(l) a-




(output / land unit)
L 0
Figure 2.3: O’s Potential Marginal Product
When O is close enough to C so that he is impacted by the externality, his marginal pro-
ductivity will be equal to
￿ less the marginal production loss due to the externality. This
function is illustrated in Figure 2.3. O’s total production can be found by integrating the






































































































￿ intercept, where the externality impact is zero. If O could
choose the lower bound of the ﬁrst integrand, he would choose to back up production fur-
ther, increasing his production in the constant returns to land range. However, he is bound
by the length of the line. Thus, he is not indifferent about where his production is located23
– he will choose a location that minimizes externality damage, all other things being equal.
This result would still hold if O experienced diminishing returns to land for all production
since marginal productivity would be relatively lower in the region of externality damage.
Spatial Properties of O’sProduction Technology The marginal productivity of land for
O will depend on the location of the additional unit. If the lower margin of production is
extended, implying a relaxation in the land constraint, O gains a unit of production in the
externality-free range with marginal value
￿ . If, however, O extends production one unit









. This marginal product will always be
positive as long as the maximal damage is less than O’s marginal productivity of land,
￿ .
O’s production function is now quasi-concave throughout: the externality has imposed












in the region of externality damage. This production impact
leads directly to the emergence of an optimal distance from the conventional border for the
organic grower.
If C decreases her scale by one unit (or, alternatively, moves her border one additional
distance unit away from O), and the location of O’s border remains ﬁxed, O will gain a unit
of production in the constant returns range and lose a unit in the range of externality dam-















is illustrated in Figure 2.4 and derived formally in Appendix A. The result may contradict










. The explanation for the result is that the generation point of the externality
has shifted, thus, the point on the organic grower’s land where no externality damage has
occurred has also shifted. The result is a larger range of externality-free production for the
organic grower, and a smaller range of production in the region impacted by the external-
ity. Thisresult isimportant forunderstanding thespatial interpretation forasocially optimal
arrangement ofproduction, discussed below. Thecondition forthe social optimum will bal-
ance thevalueofshiftingthegeneration pointofexternality damage against thelossofaunit
of conventional production.



































































































































































































































































Figure 2.4: Production Gain by a Reduction in C’s Scale (O’s border ﬁxed)
The Alternative Use The alternative use operates under constant returns to land with a
ﬁxed marginal product of
￿
.
￿ Since A is unaffected by externalities, A’s productivity is in-






￿ , A’s total production is simply:
￿
The free-market outcome can be viewed as a case where O and C choose to establish production in a





































Closing the Model Socially optimal and free-market outcomes are modeled in a general
equilibrium framework. General equilibrium models are commonly used to analyze exter-
nality problems since they clearly illustrate impacts on relative prices. The use of a general
equilibrium modelhereallowstraditional methodology tobeusedtoillustrate deviations be-
tween the free market and socially optimal outcomes, putting this special externality case in
thecontext ofthegeneral externality model. Therefore, arepresentative consumer isneeded
to close the model. This consumer gains utility from all three goods and is unaffected by
the externality. The outcome illustrated here is based on utility function assumptions that
















































and that the Hessian of
￿
with respect to the three goods is a negative deﬁnite matrix.
2.3 The Social Optimum
Analysisofthesocially optimal outcome servestwopurposes. First,itdemonstrates that
this class of externalities is simply a special case of the more general externality problem,
and it facilitates a spatial interpretation of the traditional conditions for social optimality.26
Second, it provides a benchmark against which to measure an unregulated free-market out-
come and evaluate the potential effectiveness of potential policy interventions.
2.3.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner maximizes the utility of the representative consumer subject to pro-










































































































































































































represent total consumption ofeach class ofoutput and the remaining












￿ represent thevalue ofland inorganic andconventional production
at the left and right ends of the line, respectively. They will also reﬂect the value of extend-






￿ represent the value
of moving the organic / alternative production boundary and the alternative / conventional
boundary, respectively.
Becauseitisassumedthattheexternality isneversosevereastopreventpositive organic




















































































































































































This is the familiar condition equating the marginal social values of production of the or-
ganic and conventional goods. Both the marginal social beneﬁt and the marginal social cost
￿
By using the endpoints as lower and upper bounds when calculating production, it is implicitly assumed
these constraints are slack.28
(negative production impact) of C’s production are accounted for. Some further analysis













































￿ , represents the total productivity gain to O of de-
creasing C’s production by one unit at the border closest to O and subsequently moving O’s
border one unit closer to C. The net gain is
￿ units of production for O. A graphical inter-
pretation, illustrated in Figure 2.5, provides clariﬁcation. Recall that a one-unit reduction
in scale by C implies an additional unit of production possible in constant returns to scale
region, where the net marginal productivity is equal to
￿ . If O’s scale stays ﬁxed, it implies
a decrease of one-unit in the production range negatively impacted by the externality (illus-






￿ represents a one unit increase in O’s scale, which ex-
actly compensates for the production loss in the second range. The net impact is to provide
an additional unit of externality-free production for O. In short, the expression in parenthe-
sis represents the tradeoff at the margin between C’s production and O’s production. The
result is formally demonstrated in Appendix A.
The condition for the social optimum then has a very simple representation in this case


















The beneﬁts of shifting the externality generation point and thus granting O an additional
unit of production free of externality damage are balanced against the beneﬁts of an addi-29



































































































(output / land unit)
a
Net Gain: a
Figure 2.5: Production Gain by a Reduction in C’s Scale (O’s border moves)










￿ and since the value of an additional unit of production of the




























The socially optimal solution implies that values of an additional unit of available land at
either end of the line are equated. This result may contradict initial intuition that a balance
ofmarginal values at shared borders is asufﬁcient condition foroptimality. Infact, it is nec-









￿ ), shadow values are not equated at all borders. These differences in
shadow values correspond to the spatial heterogeneity of externality damages. Speciﬁcally,
land at the organic / alternative border is less valuable than land at the organic extensive30

























2.4 The Free-market Outcome
In the free-market outcome, each producer takes market prices and the behavior of the
other producers as given. Speciﬁcally, each land owner takes the others’ locations as given.
Since productivity for the alternative and conventional ﬁrms does not depend on others’
locations, the locations of others’ borders do not enter these choice problems. However,
since O’s productivity is speciﬁcally dependent on the location of C’s nearest border, this
border explicitly enters as a parameter in his choice problem.
2.4.1 The Conventional and Alternative Firms
The conventional producer will produce until the marginal value of production is equal

















optimal solution is independent of O’s location or extent of production.
Because the alternative use operates under constant returns to land, the manager of the








2.4.2 The Organic Producer
In this model, the organic producer understands the nature of the externality damage
and therefore implicitly chooses the level of damage he experiences by choosing how close
to the conventional producer he farms. Freeman discusses a parallel example of acid de-
position on land, using the terminology “depletable externality,” and demonstrates that a
depletable externality is simply a special case of the more general externality problem [11].
Thischapter comestothe sameconclusion. However, itsubstantially expands thedeﬁnition
ofanexternality usedbyFreemantoinclude the casewhere therecipient understands poten-
tial damages and implicitly chooses the level of externality damage experienced. Baumol
and Oates [4] outline two essential conditions which deﬁne an environmental externality.
First, the decision variables of one economic actor must have real (non-monetary) impacts
on the utility or production relationships of another economic actor. Second, the ﬁrst eco-
nomic actor must not personally pay costs equal to the impacts to the second actor (in the
case of a negative externality).
Freeman argues that the case of acid rain does not meet Baumol and Oates’ deﬁnition of
an externality, commenting “the essence of the externality problem is that individuals can-
not choose the level of the externality affecting them [11]”. It is argued here that, consistent
with the conditions outlined by Baumol and Oates, the essence of the externality problem
is that individuals’ choices do not impact the level of externality-generating activity in the
economy. In the problem outlined below, the organic producer understands and therefore
chooses the level of damage he experiences. However, since the organic producer takes the32
location of the conventional producer’s border as given, he also takes externality output as
given – from his perspective, his choice of location does not impact the level of potential
externality damage in the economy. Most important, the conventional producer does not
account for the costs of externality damage to O when making her production choice. This
lack of accounting for external costs and beneﬁts ofindividual decisions isthe essential fea-
ture of an externality which can lead to market failure. As demonstrated below, since this
externality meets Baumol and Oates’ fundamental deﬁnition, a deviation between the free-
market (non-bargaining) outcome and the social optimum occurs, and the characterization
of this market failure matches that of a traditional externality problem.
￿
The organic farmer maximizes proﬁts from production, taking the location of the con-
ventional producer’s border and therefore the externality damage at each point in space as
given. He will choose the location of his border, and therefore implicitly both the total
amount of production and his distance from the conventional border, by renting and farm-
ing land to the point where the marginal value of production is equal to the marginal cost of
an additional unit of land given the location of C’s border. For a given
￿
￿
￿ , this optimal so-


















￿ will deﬁne O’s distance from
C. This result is demonstrated algebraically in the case of the linear externality. O’s optimal
￿
The point that the ability to choose the level of damage experienced does not that externalities are ap-
propriately controlled generalizes. For example, consumershave the opportunity to control their exposureto
environmental externalities through their own purchase decisions in many cases. The case of the booming
market for bottled water is one example. The purchase of home air ﬁlters is another. In these cases, the con-
sumer’sabilitytopersonallycontrolexposureisinnowaylinkedtotheamountofdamagetheconsumercould
potentially experience,andso,the levelof market failure dueto theexternalities is not impactedby consumer
avoidancebehavior.33






































￿ represents O’s optimal distance from the conventional producer’s bor-
der. This individually optimal buffer zone buffer is decreasing in
￿
, the dispersal rate. In-
tuitively, a higher dispersal rate implies that the distance at which the externality impact is
zero becomes smaller, and the marginal damage at any point in space other than the border
is also smaller. It is increasing in
￿ , the maximal damage. Higher damage at the genera-
tion point means that a greater distance is required to completely avoid the externality and
that marginal externality damage is greater at every point. Therefore, the economic loss to
the organic producer at any given distance from C’s border will be greater for a given set
of input and output prices. The optimal buffer is also decreasing in the price of the organic
good and increasing in the rental rate of land.
Finally, O’s optimal border location depends on the location of C’s border. If C’s bor-
der moves one unit farther away, O will move his border closer by one unit. Intuitively, C
takes one step back and O responds with one step forward. This result is linked to the fact
that the externality declines linearly and to the explicit assumption that the externality is not
dependent on C’s scale.34
2.4.3 The Consumer
The single consumer owns all the land and all three ﬁrms. As is traditional in general
equilibrium models with a single representative agent, her consumption and production de-
cisions are modeled as being independent from one another. She receives income from the
sale of land, which she owns, and from the proﬁts from production. Her ﬁrst-order condi-
tionsequatethemarginalutility ofeach goodtoitsmarketprice, givenherbudgetconstraint.
2.4.4 The Free-Market Outcome
TheFree-MarketCondition Combiningtheﬁrst-orderequations forproductionandcon-












































The value of an additional unit of the organic good, given the conventional producer’s
location, is equated to the value ofthe last unit ofproduction of the conventional good. This
condition clearly differsfromthe socially optimal outcome inthe traditional way–marginal
beneﬁts of each method of production are equated, without accounting for marginal exter-
nal costs. Once again, examination of the market rental rates, or market shadow values, of
land at different points in space reveals the spatial dimensions of market failure. In both the
socially optimal and free-market outcomes, values at the organic-alternative border and at
the alternative-conventional border are equated. However, the market rental rate of land at35
these borders is higher in the free-market outcome than under the social optimum. In fact,
the rent gradient for organic land is higher everywhere under the free-market outcome.
Additional insight regarding land rental rates comes from comparing shadow values of
land at the extensive margin of production. In the socially optimal outcome, the shadow
value of an additional unit of externality-free production land was equated to the shadow
value of an additional unit land to produce the conventional good (Equation 2.10). In the













￿ , is higher. Speciﬁcally, from





























































value of avoided damage
(2.15)
Comparing Equation 2.15 to Equation 2.10 describing the social optimum, it is clear that
the rental rate of a unit of externality-free land for O is higher by the value of externality
damage avoided at the margin. The value of avoiding externality damage has been incor-
porated inthe market rental rate ofexternality-free production land. Thisresult isthe spatial
manifestation of the cost disadvantage faced by the organic producer due to the externality.
It is a standard result in externality problems that relative output prices for the generator of
the externality will be lower than is socially optimal due to uninternalized costs, and this
price advantage over other ﬁrms will result in a higher relative level of production for the
externality generation product than is socially optimal [3]. In this particular case, higher
rental rates of organic land due to external costs potentially create a barrier to entry for or-36
ganic ﬁrms, resulting in relatively less organic production and relatively more conventional
production than is optimal.
Free-Market vs. Socially Optimal Land Allocation As expected, in the free-market
outcome, less land is devoted to organic production and more to conventional production
than is socially optimal. This standard result is easily demonstrated by comparing the con-
ditions for a social optimum (Equation 2.8) and the free-market condition (Equation 2.14)
and invoking monotonicity properties of the utility and production functions.
Thestandard result that the total externality damage occurring under the social optimum
is less than under the free-market outcome also holds. The spatial aspect of these results is
revealed through examination of the optimal scale for the alternative land use. It is easily
demonstrated that the scale of production for the alternative use is larger under the social
optimum than under the free-market situation. This larger scale of production for the alter-
native use has an important spatial implication. If the alternative use is viewed as a buffer
separating the two potentially conﬂicting land uses, that buffer zone will be larger under the
social optimum than under the free-market outcome. This implies that the total externality
damage experienced bytheorganic producer willbesmaller, since O’sborder willbefarther
from the externality generation point. More signiﬁcantly, this result implies that in a free-
market setting, potentially conﬂicting uses will be too close together, since the individually
optimal buffer for the externality recipient is smaller than the socially optimal buffer. The
result rationalizes the existence ofbuffer zones imposed byregulatory authorities. While an37
incentive exists for individuals to distance themselves from damaging activities, this incen-
tive will not lead them to leave enough distance between themselves and the harmful land
uses.
Market Value of Conventional Output
Market Value of Organic Output
Market Value of Alternative Use
o l la
















Figure 2.6: The Free Market Condition
The free-market outcome is illustrated in Figure 2.6. A numerical example of the solu-
tion to the competitive equilibrium is given in Appendix B.38
2.5 Policy Interventions
2.5.1 Optimal Taxation
The social optimum can theoretically be decentralized in a market equilibrium under
Pigovian taxes, as long as the marginal tax is distance-dependent. If C faces a tax depen-











































































































, the condition for a social optimum is obtained. It
should be noted that this approach, while theoretically plausible, would be highly imprac-
tical due to information problems. Implementation of the tax would require a scientiﬁc un-
derstanding of the externality damage function, knowledge of the locations of potentially
affected parties, and knowledge of the social values of their production.39
2.5.2 Liability Rules























































































Since the location of the organic producer’s border now enters explicitly into C’s choice
problem, her solution will now be in terms of an optimal distance from O from O for C.
Theliability rulehasinduced anindividually optimal bufferdistance forC.Shewillproduce
only within a range such that her production revenue less the marginal externality compen-
sation is equal to the price of land.
Assuming that the organic producer receives compensation for damages as a lump sum
payment, his ﬁrst-order condition will be unchanged because the payment falls out of the








































Substituting marginal utilities forprices, andsubtracting the value oftheexternality damage
from both sides, the condition for the social optimum (Equation 2.10) is obtained.
The realism of the assumption that the organic producer sees the payment as lump sum
deserves some consideration, especially because of the potential proximity and small num-40
berofplayers involved. Infact, the existence ofaliability rule probably creates somestrate-
gic incentives for the affected party. Anecdotal evidence from cases other than the organic /
conventional one suggests such strategic behavior does take place, indicating that the liabil-
ity rule could create a market distortion that favors the organic grower, assuming complete
property rights were in place.
2.5.3 Coase Theorem Results
If O can costlessly negotiate with both A and C, and the conventional producer has the
right to pollute, the optimal allocation of land use can theoretically be achieved via Coasean
bargaining. First, recall that C’s free-market scale will be larger than socially optimal if she
has the right to inﬂict the externality on O. Given that C faces diminishing marginal pro-
ductivity, this implies a lower marginal product of land at C’s extensive margin than under
the social optimum. Given that the consumer experiences diminishing marginal utility from





























Under the free-market outcome this will hold as an inequality, since the right side will be
less than before. Further, the market price will equal the marginal utilities for each good in














If O can convince C to occupy one less unit of land, and, at the same time, buy out A so
as to increase his extensive margin, he will gain the value of one unit of production in the
constant returns to scale range. The intuition is the same as in the above discussion of the
condition for the social optimum – by getting C to take one step back, he shifts the intercept
point where the externality impact is zero and gains a unit of production in the externality-






￿ , the net revenue in this range, to gain
this additional production.









































































￿ . This will deﬁne an
optimal scale and border location for C.Substituting marginal utilities for prices and adding




















exactly the condition for a social optimum from Equation (2.10). Thus, bargaining between
the parties over land usage can theoretically achieve the social optimum. In effect, O will
pay C to shift back the location of her border, or equivalently, to leave a buffer between her
production edge andC’sborder. However, note that even inthissimpleexample, bargaining
is somewhat complex due to the spatial separation between the organic and conventional42
farmer. Externalities with far-reaching impacts are in fact quite common, so it is reasonable
to expect that an impacted party may have to negotiate with a distant neighbor. Further,
in the real world, a land user may be impacted by spillovers from neighbors on many sides.
The actual bargaining problem faced by landowners, then, may quickly become socomplex
that bargaining may not be a viable option.
Market Value of Alternative Use
Market Value of Organic Output










































































































































































Figure 2.7: Coasean Bargaining
Gains from trade and the Coasean solution are illustrated in Figure 2.7.
￿43
Land Occupied by 
Conventional Producer
Land Occupied by 
Organic Production
Conventional Producer
Production Possibilities with one exposed border
Production Possibilities with two exposed borders
Figure 2.8: Production Loss from Vulnerable Edges44
2.6 Landscape Fragmentation
Since the average externality damage to O declines as the amount of land occupied by
O increases, it is advantageous for O to occupy one contiguous parcel. By doing this, he
minimizes the amount ofborder exposed to externality damages, or, in other words, he min-
imizes vulnerable edges. Figure 2.8 illustrates the production loss from farming non-
contiguous parcels.
Imagine a case where there are two organic producers and one conventional producer
active in the economy. It is economically efﬁcient to group the organic producers together.
Initial intuition would suggest that market prices will provide appropriate agglomeration
incentives for recipients. However, when located next to one another, the two organic pro-
ducers impose mutual positive externalities by providing externality protection. Further,
these positive externalities are asymmetric – the producer farthest from the generator will
receive higher beneﬁts, and the producer closest lower beneﬁts. The potential asymmet-
ric positive externalities will not be reﬂected in land prices. Figure 2.9 illustrates this phe-
nomenon. Imaginethattwoorganicproducerschooselocations inaconventional landscape.
Each would prefer a location sharing no borders with a conﬂicting use. The ﬁrst producer
locates at A. His payoffs are highest if the second producer locates at B since he gains two
protected borders. However, her payoffs will be the same at either B or C: in each location,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ First Organic Producer
Second Organic Producer
The first organic producer would prefer the second to locate next to him:
Figure 2.9: Multiple Recipients46
Theshort lessonhere isthat Coasean bargaining between externality recipients, notsim-
ply between generators and recipients, may be necessary to achieve optimal solutions. In
fact, it may be a critical factor if the economy is to reach the optimal arrangement, as well
as allocation of land uses.
2.7 Conclusions and Future Work
2.7.1 Conclusions
StandardResultsinaSpatialContext Thischapter hasdemonstrated theexplicit spatial
manifestation of results common to all standard externality models. The failure of the free
market to equate marginal net social beneﬁts of the impacted and generating use is reﬂected
through deviations between private and social shadow values of land. Speciﬁcally, in the
socially optimal outcome, the shadow value of an additional unit of land for the external-
ity recipient and generating uses is equated, with the value of moving the generator’s bor-
der farther from the recipient and therefore providing an additional unit of externality-free
production land balanced against the marginal loss of a unit of the generator’s production.
However, in the free-market outcome, the equality of marginal private values implies that
the value ofavoiding externality damage on land free of the externality is fully incorporated
in the land rent paid by the externality recipient, resulting in too little organic and too much
conventional production. Thestandard result that the socially optimal level ofoutput forthe
generating use is less than under the free market has implications for equilibrium distances47
between land uses. Ina spatial context, the relatively smaller level of output forthe generat-
ing use implies less land in the generating use and more land in the recipient and alternative
uses. This implies a larger buffer zone between the externality generator and recipient than
occurs in the free market. Because the recipient’s border is then farther fromthe generator’s
border, it also implies that less externality damage occurs.
Finally, traditional policy interventions operate effectively as long as they explicitly ac-
count forspace. Aﬁxedmarginal taxdependent onthe externality generator’s distance from
the recipient’s border, if correctly set, operates effectively as a corrective Pigovian tax. A
liability rule succeeds by creating an incentive for the generator to distance himself from
the recipient. Under Coasean bargaining, the recipient compensates the generator for mov-
ing production farther from the recipient’s production border, or alternatively, for leaving
a buffer between the two uses. Due to the complexities of spatial heterogeneity, strategic
incentives, and multiple neighbor interactions, however, the practicality of these traditional
policies is questionable.
Policy Implications Each one-dimensional implication outlined in this chapter leads to a
corresponding policy question. The chapter has demonstrated that the market disadvantage
experienced by externality recipients is manifested in terms of higher land rental rates for
externality-impacted land uses. This leads to the question of whether a land taxation struc-
ture in which tax rates for externality-impacted land are relatively lower than for the gen-48
erating use could successfully mitigate externalities.
￿
It has been demonstrated that the ex-
ternality creates a distancing incentive for the recipient that could be viewed as an individu-
ally optimal buffer zone. This incentive should theoretically encourage impacted land users
to group together, encouraging the development of an economic landscape that maximizes
production possibilities through geographic concentration of impacted land users. How-
ever, the chapter hasalso demonstrated that possible barriers to the development of efﬁcient
patterns are present. First, this individually optimal buffer zone provides less separation
between conﬂicting uses than is socially optimal, implying that the free market may leave
conﬂicting uses too close together. This result rationalizes one of the most commonly used
mechanismsinland-useregulation, theimpositionofbufferzonesforexternality-generating
uses. However, thequestion ofwhetherthese mandatorybufferzoneswillencourage thede-
velopment of economically optimal production patterns remains. Second, the chapter has
demonstrated that production possibility impacts due to edge-effect externalities lead to the
potential forpositive externalities between externality recipients duetospatial economies of
scale in production.
￿
This result implies that the beneﬁts of agglomeration will not be fully
reﬂected in land prices, potentially resulting in inefﬁcient and fragmented patterns of land
use. The result rationalizes the existence of zoning laws and also suggests that institutional
arrangements between neighboring land users may serve to address not only the potential
￿
Policies that provide for lower taxes for land committed to an agricultural use, such as California’s
Williamson Act, are examples of such a tax structure.
￿
These potential positive externalities are probably most relevant in cases where the optimal ﬁrm size is
small, suchasthe caseof small farms growing specialtycrops, residential housingunits, or small retail ﬁrms.
Otherwise, the creation of one large ﬁrm would be a possible response to these increasing returns to spatial
scale.49




2.7.2 Expanding the Model
Scale-Dependent Externalities Many examples of edge-effect externalities exhibit scale
dependence. In these cases, the externality damage at each point in space and the spatial ex-
tent oftheexternality increases astheamountofcontiguous land occupied bytheexternality
generator increases. An important example of a scale-dependent spatial externality in the
newsoflate isthe case oflivestock feedlots, in particular, hogfarms. Acouple ofimportant
implications are suggested. First, the difference in buffer size between the free-market and
socially optimal buffer will be smaller, since a decrease in scale by the generator has magni-
ﬁed impacts in terms of decreasing externality damage. Conversely, increases in scale can
be very damaging. An interesting implication is that if externalities are scale dependent, it
may be optimal to break up production by the externality-generating land user, in spite of
the fact that smaller parcels for the generator may increase land-use fragmentation.
Two-dimensional Impacts A set of global questions related to the landscape impacts of
edge-effect externalities remain. Under what initial geographic and economic conditions
can efﬁcient production patterns be expected to develop on their own? In cases where the
market might not lead to efﬁcient patterns, will policy interventions such as taxes, liability
￿
￿
An example of the type of neighborhood compact that may cause both positive and negative externali-
ties to be internalized is the type of integrated pest management agreement in which all neighbors agree to
participate in a particular pest control regime.50
rules, zoninglaws,andmandatory bufferzonesbeequally effective atinducing boththecor-
rectscaleandpatternofeconomicactivity? Willtheeffectiveness ofthesemeasuresinterms
of their impact on relative prices and output depend on equilibrium patterns of land use?
Due to the level of complexity of spatial interdependencies and neighbor interactions in a
two-dimensional landscape over a simpliﬁed one-dimensional model, a two-dimensional
modeling approach is appropriate for addressing these questions. Chapters 3 and 4 lay the




Because Chapter 2 focused on the implications of edge-effect externalities for the allo-
cation of land to and for the distance between potentially conﬂicting land uses, an intriguing
feature of edge-effect externalities – their potential to induce non-convexities – was largely
set aside. The link between externalities and potential non-convexities in production possi-
bilities has been recognized for some time [6, 4, 17]. This link has largely been discussed
in abstract theoretical terms. Edge-effect externalities offer a concrete, accessible, and pol-
icy relevant example of these potential non-convexities. This chapter outlines the potential
production impacts of non-convexities under edge-effect externalities. Chapter 4 illustrates
possible impacts that non-convexities may have on land-use patterns in a free-market set-
ting.52
3.1 Non-convexities and Land Use Allocation
The potential for externalities to create a non-convex production possibilities frontier
as allocation of land varies between two land uses is outlined by Baumol and Oates [4].
A simple, one-dimensional model demonstrates this possibility in the case of edge-effect
externalities.
The hypothetical landscape is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Available land is represented by
a square, with no negative production impacts occurring at the edges of the square. The
parcel occupied by the recipient is square and originates at the Southeast corner of the land-
scape. For mathematical simplicity, the externality damage is represented by a ﬁxed loss at
the recipient’s border. Recipient production is zero within a one unit distance of the genera-
tor. This representation is consistent with a mandatory buffer left by the recipient use. The
production impacts of a marginally declining production loss would be similar. Finally, the
constant marginal productivity of each unit of productive land is normalized to one. With-
out the externality, this production possibilities frontier would be a straight line due to the
assumption of constant returns to scale.
The landscape boundary has length
￿
. The length of the shared boundary occupied by
the generator is represented by
￿ . The side of the recipient’s plot has length
￿ , and
￿ rep-
resents the extent of the externality loss. This leaves the externality recipient with a core
production area represented by the darkest shading.



























































￿ . By solving equations 3.1 and 3.3 for
￿ and
￿ ,
respectively, and substituting these values into the land constraint, an equation for the pro-54
duction possibilities frontier can be derived. This frontier represents the tradeoff between


































































follows. Conceptually, the graph represents output
combinations as the area of the square occupied by
￿ varies from 0 to 144 units.
This demonstration of the potential non-convexity of the production set parallels that
found in Baumol and Oates [4], although their demonstration is based on a production ex-
ternality with constant marginal impacts. What are the practical implications of this theo-
retical possibility? First, the implications will depend on the empirical likelihood of a non-
convexity. Edge effect externalities fall into the class likely to result in non-convexities as
reviewed by Burrows [6], since they are characterized by decreasing marginal damages and
multiplicative dependence. If non-convexities are empirically important, they may lead to
corner solutions, where a landscape is locally dominated by one production process.
Baumol and Oates note that non-convexities can be mitigated by spatial separation of





















Figure 3.2: Non-convex Production Possibilities Frontier56
result is imposed as an assumption and not derived from production and externality rela-
tionships. Inthe case ofedge-effect externalities, this separation has a natural interpretation
– the land use potentially damaged by the externality is far enough away so that externality
impacts are negligible. These results on non-convexities related to the allocation of land
between uses can be completely described in the framework of a one-dimensional model,
such as that presented in chapter 2. While these results have been recognized in the litera-
ture for some time, attention has faded due perhaps to a lack of empirical, policy-relevant
examples of the phenomenon.
3.2 Non-convexities and Land-use Arrangement
Theabove demonstration ofthepotential foranon-convex production possibilities fron-
tier focuses on varying land allocation between twopossible uses. In the case of edge-effect
externalities, an additional source of non-convexities is possible. Holding the allocation of
land between each use ﬁxed, fragmentation of the economic landscape can result in non-
linear declines in production possibilities. This result parallels the impacts of ecological
edge effects, where habitat fragmentation can result in non-linear declines in intact interior
habitat. These non-convexities have several possible implications. First, a “corner solu-
tion” may imply a spatial equilibrium in which a disadvantaged land use is driven out of a
particular region. This result may depend on the arrangement of land uses. If several sim-
ilar land uses are efﬁciently arranged, they may maintain a viable economic presence in a57
local landscape. However, if they are geographically dispersed, the activity may not be eco-
nomically viable and may become locally extinct. This corner solution may be not socially
optimal. Thisnaturally suggests the next implication. Not only can non-convexities be mit-
igated through spatial separation ofconﬂicting land uses,non-convexities can beminimized
iflandusesareefﬁciently arranged. Theseresultsmayhaveimportant implications forland-
use planning and the design of zoning laws.
A set of simple, stylized examples illustrates the production possibility impacts of land-
use fragmentation under edge-effect externalities. These examples are based on the land-
scape illustrated in Figure 3.1, and use differences in the number of and shape of parcels to
illustrate the impacts of land-use fragmentation. The impacts of fragmentation on produc-
tion possibilities, measured through average productivity, are reported in Table 3.1.
Graph Average Product Edge/Area Height/Width Num. Parcels Adj. Herﬁndahl
S1/N1 0.7 0.67 1 1 1
S2 0.67 0.72 2.25 1 1
S3 0.61 0.83 4 1 1
N2 0.58 0.94 1 2 1
N4/C1 0.44 1.34 1 4 1
C2 0.46 1.3 1 4 0.83
C3 0.5 1.2 1 4 0.64
Table 3.1: Economic Impacts of Landscape Fragmentation
As intact habitat will vary with the degree of landscape fragmentation under ecological
edge effects, production possibilities will vary with fragmentation under edge effect exter-
nalities. Parcel shape, the number of parcels, and the distribution of land within parcels col-58
lectively represent different possible dimensions of“fragmentation” ofland use. Landscape
ecologists have developed numerous statistics and indices to measure fragmentation [24].
For purposes of illustration, three fairly simple statistics that concisely demonstrate vari-
ation of production possibilities in each dimension are presented. These measures are a
height/width ratio for parcels, the number of parcels, and a normalized concentration in-
dex, designed to reﬂect inequality in area distribution, independent of the number of sepa-
rate parcels. It is conceptually similar to “eveness” indices found in ecology.
￿
.
In ﬁgure 3.3, the amount of land area occupied by the externality recipient (the sum of
the light gray and black areas) in each graph is constant. “Average Product” is simply the
proportion of land held by the externality recipient which goes to productive use.
Productionpossibilities (expressed byaverage product)aredecreasing inheight towidth
ratio, decreasing in the number of parcels, and increasing in concentration. There is an in-
verserelationship between productivity andedge perunit area. Thelandscape conﬁguration
that minimizes conﬂicting edge per unit area also maximizes production possibilities. The
broad implication is that edge per unit area can be used as an empirical proxy for average
productivity. However, in order to understand the sources of possible efﬁciency loss, mea-
sures reﬂecting each potential dimension of fragmentation must also be examined.
These production losses due to landscape fragmentation are a key, previously unrecog-
nized possibledimensiontomarketfailure underedge-effect externalities. Thefullextent of
potential losses are apparent only in atwo-dimensional framework. Non-convexities result-
￿
Additional detail on these statistics is provided in Chapter 559
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Figure 3.3: Varying Parcel Conﬁgurations60
ing fromexternalities have been previously recognized asimportant due to their potential to
lead to corner solutions. In many economic problems, non-convexities have been shown to
play an additional important role. They may lead to multiple equilibria in theoretical free-
market outcomes, with some equilibria dominating others from a welfare perspective. In
the case of edge-effect externalities, the implication is that multiple outcomes in terms of
patterns of economic activity may be possible, with some patterns of activity Pareto dom-
inating others. Thus, the free market may not only fail to achieve the correct allocation of
land between uses, it may also fail to achieve efﬁcient patterns of production. This possi-
bility is the focus of Chapter 4.61
Chapter 4
A Computational Economics Approach
to Landscape Outcomes under
Edge-Effect Externalities
4.1 Landscape Outcomes
In general, analysis of market failure under externalities has focused on aggregate pro-
duction outcomes. Ithaslongbeenrecognized thatunder externalities, toomuchproduction
from the externality generating use will occur, and an insufﬁcient quantity of the recipient’s
product will besupplied. [21,3]. Asdiscussed inChapters 2and 3,the relationship between
thespatial arrangement oflandusesandnon-convexities inproduction possibilities hasbeen
recognized for some time. Yet, literature to date on distance dependent spatial externalities62
has not yet addressed the question of arrangement of land uses in free-market outcomes.
Most authors, including Baumol and Oates [4], Kanemoto [18], Tietenberg [34], and Free-
man [11]have focused primarily on socially optimal outcomes. Tomasi and Weise [35]and
Parker [30] analyze competitive outcomes in the context of a one-dimensional model, but
assume efﬁcient spatial agglomeration of generating and recipient uses.
Thischapter analyzes free market land usepatterns under distance-dependent spatial ex-
ternalities, using a cellular automaton model where cell occupants chose land use type to
maximize proﬁts from production. Proﬁts are potentially inﬂuenced by demand and pro-
duction parameters, types of adjacent neighbors for externality recipients, and distance de-
pendent transportation costs to markets. Several key results are demonstrated:
￿ Either transportation costs or edge-effect externalities may be sufﬁcient to deﬁne a
spatial equilibrium of land uses.
￿ Initial distributions of recipients and generators do not inﬂuence the equilibrium con-
ﬁguration of ﬁrms under transport costs only.
￿ Initial conditions will inﬂuence theequilibrium spatial conﬁguration under spatial ex-
ternalities. These initial conditions can include the initial spatial distribution of ﬁrms
and the existence of protective geographic features.
￿ Underexternalities, competitive equilibrium outcomesmaynotbePareto optimal due
toinitial conditions whichleadtoinefﬁcient patterns ofproduction. Speciﬁcally, equi-
librium landscapes may be too fragmented in the sense that more than one cluster of63
recipient ﬁrms exist. However, individual clusters will tend to evolve to relatively
efﬁcient, edge-minimizing shapes.
￿ Spatialexternalities mayinduce thetraditional Von-Thunenlandscape tobecomemore
fragmented anddispersed than without externalities. Thus,spatial externalities repre-
sent an alternative explanation for geographic dispersion of economic activity to that
of monopolistic competition. Sufﬁciently high transportation costs will outweigh in-
centives created by externalities, and agglomeration will occur. However, the shape
of the recipient cluster will be more compact than without externalities, reﬂecting the
proﬁt tradeoff between protected edges and lower transaction costs.
Section 4.2 of this chapter will outline the model’s assumptions regarding production
technology and will illustrate the negative production impacts of edge-effect externalities.
Section 4.3 will outline the economics of landscape evolution, including the supply behav-
ior of each type of producer and the rules governing transitions between types of produc-
tion. Section 4.4 will demonstrate and analyze equilibrium outcomes under transport costs,
edge-effect externalities, and combinations of both inﬂuences. Finally, Section 4.5 will of-
fer conclusions and suggest directions for future work.
4.2 Production
Production takes place costlessly on each 1 unit square plot of land. Land is the sin-
gle input to production. Two land uses are possible in this simple economic landscape, an64






plicity. It is assumed that the generator’s optimal scale of land use is exactly reached within
the bounds of the 1 unit plot of land. Therefore, no agglomeration economies are present
for generators, and the amount of production is independent of the types of the generator’s
neighbors. This story is consistent with an externality-generating land use that operates at
a relatively small optimal scale, such as a unit of residential housing, a small farm under a
single manager, or a small retail business.
4.2.2 Recipients
Thesecond type,
￿ ,canpotentially produce withanaverage product of
￿
oneach square
unit of land. This value is also set to 1. However, type
￿ is potentially impacted by a neg-
ative production externality generated by
￿
’s production. The externality damage is spa-
tially dependent, with marginal damage decreasing as distance from the generator’s border
increases. For this particular application, the marginal damage is assumed to decrease lin-
early and to reach zero within the neighboring cell. This implies that the externality will
impact only the plot of land adjacent to the generator.
An illustration in Figure 4.1 clariﬁes the externality damage function. At the border of
￿
’s production site,
￿ experiences a loss of production of magnitude
￿ . This marginal loss65
declines as distance from the border
￿







￿ . Total externality damage
￿ isfoundbyintegrating overtherange
of damage and the length of the border. For this application, parameter values are imposed





unit along each border. Across-section of
￿ ’s
marginal production possibilities along a border with a recipient (no externality damage)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(marginal product / land unit)
(Recipient-Occupied Cell)
b
(Recipient-Occupied Cell) (Generator-Occupied Cell)
Figure 4.2: Cross-section of
￿ ’s Production Possibilities
It is clear that total possible production for type
￿ will depend on the number of bor-
ders shared with a generator, and that a location sharing no borders with a generator will be
most productive. This production impact has implications for the efﬁciency of any produc-66
tion landscape impacted by edge-effect externalities. In general, a landscape which mini-
mizes borders between recipients and generators, or alternatively, in which recipients are
maximally agglomerated, will maximize production possibilities. For any ﬁxed area of re-
cipient production, production possibilities will decrease as the number of production sites
increases, the shape of production sites becomes less compact, and the distribution of pro-
duction between sites becomes less skewed.
4.3 Markets
A very simple structure consistent with the metaphor of conventional and organic agri-
cultural producers is imposed on the model. Markets for the generating good are well de-
veloped, and demand and supply are sufﬁciently high so that each can be considered ex-
ogenous. The recipient use, consistent with a local, niche market, faces downward sloping
demand and locally determined aggregate supply. These assumptions regarding recipient
demand and production provide sufﬁcient convexity to produce an economic equilibrium
where both products are produced within the region.








, normalized to 1 for simplicity. Therefore, the proﬁtability of operating as type
￿











4.3.2 Returns to type
￿
Recipients face a downward sloping, iso-elastic demand curve for their product. The
structure of demand is known, and recipients calculate expected price by assuming that one
additional ﬁrm (their own ﬁrm) enters the market. Proﬁtability for producing as type
￿ in
any given cell is impacted by the surrounding geography of the cell, since production losses
occur when adjacent cells are occupied by types
￿
. Proﬁts are also potentially impacted
by transportation costs to market, which are calculated according to the cell’s Euclidean












































































,itisclear that unless arecipient isinalocation with no
neighboring generators, a price premium over
￿
￿
will be required to induce a cell occupant
to chose type
￿ . Thisprice premiumwill include compensation for lossesdue to externality
damage and for transportation costs.
For any number of protected borders and transportation cost, there will be a price
￿
￿68
which will just induce a cell occupant to covert from generator to recipient status
￿
. This
price deﬁnes the supply price for a recipient with a given geographic location. The price is
the solution for
￿

























The total quantity supplied at each price is found by summing production for all recipi-
ents willing to supply at that price. It is important to note that this is a myopic supply curve.
Each producer is in effect making his or her supply decision assuming that all others in the
landscape will not change their types. Most important, each producer does not account for
the fact that his neighbors may change type in the same round.








￿ . The equilibrium market price and quantity of recipients is determined by the intersec-
tion of supply and demand. This equilibrium for an arbitrary initial landscape conﬁguration
with a market in the Northwest corner of the board and transportation costs of 0.01 is illus-
trated in Figure 4.3.
￿
4.3.3 Rules of the Game




￿ , given the market price
￿
￿ calculated above and a choice of whichever
type offers highest proﬁts. The model operates over the inner rows of the board only, with
the rows of cells along the outer edges representing permanent geographic features. An al-
￿
In the model, if proﬁts from both uses are equal, the cell occupant choosesrecipient status.
￿
Bordercells, assumedto representﬁxedgeographicfeatures,are ignoredin constructingthe equilibrium.
Note that in Figure 4.3, the total equilibrium quantity of recipient production is less than the total number of
recipient-occupied cells due to production losses from externality damage.69
Initial Landscape







Demand and Supply for R
Figure 4.3: Sample Landscape and Supply Curve
ternative, often used in cellular automaton models, would be to wrap the edges of the game
board to create an edgeless landscape. The choice to impose hard edges is most appropri-
ate for this application. The primary reason is that under edge-effect externalities, location
next to permanent geographic features which provide externality protection for recipients
is a common phenomenon. Organic growers, for example, often tend to cluster next to ge-
ographic features which provide protection from pesticide drift, such as streams and hill-
sides. Permanent sound-proof walls are also often constructed as buffers between freeways
and residential areas. Since permanent geographic edges are important in the real world, it
is important to include them in the model.
The myopic supply behavior described above leads to the possibility of economically
implausible oscillation ofland uses. For example, anaive recipient mayhave two generator
neighbors and thus decide to switch to generator status. However, if each of those generator
neighbors has several recipient neighbors, they will each switch to recipient status. In order70
to avoid this type of oscillation, in each round, every other cell is allowed to choice type ac-
cording to a checkerboard pattern. For example, in the ﬁrst round, cells [(2,3), (2,5), (2,7)
... (3,2), (3,4), (3,6) ... ] move, and in the second round cells [(2,2), (2,4), (2,6) ... (3,3),
(3,5), (3,7) ...] move. Alternatives would have been to let cells move sequentially accord-
ing to some random process, or to implement a “Poisson alarm clock” which ensured that
each cells moved at a certain rate on average. The disadvantage of these strategies is the
amount of noise introduced into the outcomes. Since outcomes are highly path dependent,
ﬁnaloutcomes wouldbehighly dependent onrandomsequencing ofmoves,andtheimpacts
of initial conditions on ﬁnal outcomes would have been very difﬁcult to distinguish. Given
the current sequencing rules, outcomes are inﬂuenced by the sequencing process, but the
inﬂuence of the sequencing process is consistent for each outcome.
￿
4.4 Spatial Equilibria
If neither transportation costs or spatial externalities are present, no unique spatial equi-







￿ , a landscape with 64 cells avail-
able for production, and a price of $ 1 per unit for type
￿
, the total demand for
￿ ’s product
will be 31 units. Any spatial conﬁguration which assigns 31 units to
￿ ’s production and the
remaining 33 units to
￿
’s production would result in a stable equilibrium.
￿
The Mathematica code which generated the results reported in this chapter is available from the author
on request.71
4.4.1 The Von Thunen Model
As in the traditional Von Thunen model of the rent gradient of land surrounding a city,
transport costsalone aresufﬁcient toinduce aunique equilibrium. Twoexamples ofthe Von
Thunen outcome are presented. In this examples, no externality damage occurs. In Figures
4.4 and 4.5, recipient producers are arrayed in concentric circles surrounding the the market
located in the Northwest corner of the landscape, with the most proﬁtable locations closet
to market. Generators, not impacted by transport costs, occupy the residual hinterlands. As
transport costs increase, the number of recipient producers and total surplus in the economy
decreases.
In each of these examples, the initial landscape edges contain all generating ﬁrms and
no protective features. In fact, any initial landscape would lead to the same patterns of pro-
duction seen here under transport costs only, since the spatial equilibrium under transport
costs depends only on the location of the market and the degree of transportation costs.
4.4.2 Externality-induced Equilibria
In the absence of transport costs, edge-effect externalities are often sufﬁcient to deﬁne
a unique spatial equilibrium. This equilibrium will be inﬂuenced by initial conditions and
may or may not be efﬁcient. Both the initial distribution of recipients and generators and
initial geography, expressed by the ﬁxed cells of the landscape’s border, will inﬂuence the
equilibrium outcome.72
Initial  Landscape







Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.01
Total Recipient Production: 30.
Total Generator Production: 34.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 30.5439
Total Consumer Surplus: 499.175
Total Surplus: 563.719
Figure 4.4: A Northwest market with low transport costs and no externalities73
Initial  Landscape







Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.04
Total Recipient Production: 26.
Total Generator Production: 38.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 27.9526
Total Consumer Surplus: 494.302
Total Surplus: 560.255
Figure 4.5: A Northwest market with higher transport costs and no externalities74
Initial Distributions
In the absence of any permanent protective borders, the initial conﬁguration of genera-
tors and recipients can determine the ﬁnal equilibrium landscape. Equilibrium landscapes
will vary in efﬁciency. In Figure 4.6,arelatively fragmented initial landscape leads to anef-
ﬁcient outcome, with a single, compact cluster of recipients. This result seems surprising,
but can be explained by the small number of recipient producers in the initial landscape.
This case is consistent with a market where demand has suddenly shifted up substantially.
The initial number of recipients, 12, is much lower than the number the market can now
support, 25. With little initial production, prices are initially high, encouraging many gen-
erators to convert to recipient status, and resulting in connections between small clusters of
recipients.
￿ Those producers who are less proﬁtable, given the new connections in the land-
scape, then leave the recipient market, and the landscape evolves to an efﬁcient pattern.
The second example demonstrates initial distributions of ﬁrms which lead to the emer-
gence of an inefﬁcient landscape. In this case, the initial number of recipients (32) is more
than can be supported by current demand (30).
￿
However, the large initial number of recip-
ients may have contributed to a relatively inﬂexible landscape, resulting in the two clusters
of ﬁrms since prices are not high enough to induce ﬁrms to pioneer recipient production in
new locations.
￿
In this model, no mechanismis in place to cut off the supply of recipients when the demand curve inter-
sectsaﬂatsegmentofthesupplycurve. Therefore,supplycanovershoot,causingafallinpriceandundershoot
of supply in the next round.
￿
This numberof recipients is larger than in the ﬁrst outcomedue to the inefﬁcient arrangementof produc-












Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 22.5
Total Generator Production: 39.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 30.
Total Consumer Surplus: 458.338
Total Surplus: 527.338
Figure 4.6: A fragmented landscape under externalities leads to an efﬁcient outcome76
The second case clearly demonstrates the potential for emergence of a landscape that is
notPareto optimal under edge-effect externalities. Anymovewhichwould causeagglomer-
ation ofthetwoclusterswouldbeParetoimproving. Recipients attheborderswherethetwo
clusters connect would gain protected edges and therefore increase their production. Since
there are no transport costs and proﬁts depend only on neighbors and not location, recipi-
ents who maintain the same number of protected edges would be no worse off. Figure 4.8
demonstrates this Pareto-improving rearrangement. Notice, however, that it would not be
proﬁtable for any single recipient to switch to another production site under the initial out-
come (Figure 4.7), since market prices are too low to compensate for the loss of protective
edges. The important implication is that coalition formation may be necessary to motivate
transitions which achieve an efﬁcient landscape.
￿
The third example (Figure 4.9) demonstrates the emergence of a highly inefﬁcient land-
scape. Onceagain, theinitial numberofrecipient producers(28)ismorethanthemarketcan
support in its ﬁnal inefﬁcient production landscape of 24 producers producing 19.75 units.
The ﬁnal outcome contains several clusters of recipients, with clear potential for Pareto im-
provement. Note also that if recipients were more agglomerated, more recipient production
would be supported since the supply curve would be ﬂatter. Recall fromthe previous exam-
ple that this market could support up to 25 ﬁrms with total production of 22.5 if they were
efﬁciently located.
￿
Thanksgo to Scott Page for suggesting this example.77
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 26.
Total Generator Production: 34.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 34.6667
Total Consumer Surplus: 458.338
Total Surplus: 527.004
Figure 4.7: An inefﬁcient outcome under externalities: the shrinking market78
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 28.5
Total Generator Production: 34.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 36.
Total Consumer Surplus: 458.338
Total Surplus: 528.338
Figure 4.8: A Pareto-Improving Rearrangement79
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 19.75
Total Generator Production: 40.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 26.3333
Total Consumer Surplus: 458.338
Total Surplus: 524.671
Figure 4.9: An inefﬁcient outcome under externalities: fragmentation80
Geography
Figures 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 demonstrate equilibria determined by the locations of
protective geographic features. In Figure 4.10, a unique set of protective edges result in an
equilibrium outcome that is efﬁcient. A single agglomerated group of recipients exists, and
the shape of the recipient cluster is the most compact possible for this landscape. In com-
parison, in Figure 4.11, the single protected location leads to agglomeration of recipients,
but the shape of the recipient cluster is relatively inefﬁcient, since the height/width ratio de-
viates from 1. The second outcome has a lower total surplus, in spite of the fact that more
protected edges exist in this landscape than in the ﬁrst. In the third case (Figure 4.12), two
potential protected locations encourage development of two disconnected clusters of recip-
ients. Since the shape of these clusters is relatively efﬁcient, the third landscape results in a
higher total surplus than the second.
￿ The fact that distribution of activity between the two
clusters is relatively skewed also contributes to the relative efﬁciency of this landscape.
However, in the third outcome, a movewhich agglomerates recipients is Pareto improv-
ing. For example, if the cluster in the Southeast quadrant of the board were moved to the
Northwest, total surplus would rise. (See Figure 4.13). In this case, four protective geo-
graphic borders would be lost, but a total of six protected borders would be gained – three
in each recipient cluster. This example demonstrates the importance of positive externali-
ties between recipients. If the Southeast cluster represented a single ﬁrm, recipients in the
Northwest would have to compensate the Southeast ﬁrm to relocate in order for a more ef-
￿
The length of protected edges in the third landscapeis the same as the second.81
ﬁcient production landscape to be realized.
4.4.3 Transport Cost / Externality Interactions
Asdemonstrated above inFigures 4.4and 4.5,undertransport costsonly, recipient ﬁrms
will be clustered around the market place. The addition of edge-effect externalities will
change the character of the transport cost outcome. Speciﬁcally, landscapes with exter-
nalities also present may be more dispersed than landscapes without externalities. Further,
shapes of recipient clusters will be more compact than the traditional Von Thunen outcome.
Finally, equilibrium outcomes may not be Pareto efﬁcient, and an initially welfare-
decreasing rearrangement ofproduction mayberequired torestore theeconomy toaPareto-
improving path.
In all the following examples, a market is located in the Northwest corner of the land-





to the landscape analyzed in Figure 4.12. The outcome with these transportation costs and
no externalities is illustrated in Figure 4.4. In this case, the introduction of transport costs
induces agglomeration of ﬁrms into an efﬁcient cluster. However, the shape of the recipi-
ent cluster is more compact than under pure transport costs, reﬂecting the tradeoff between
externality protection and transportation costs. Figure 4.15 illustrates the same landscape





. Once again, the resulting cluster is more compact than
the one illustrated in Figure 4.5.
￿
￿
Transportation costs are slightly higher in this example, but the comparison is still valid.82
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 23.75
Total Generator Production: 39.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 31.6667
Total Consumer Surplus: 458.338
Total Surplus: 529.004
Figure 4.10: An efﬁcient geography under externalities83
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 23.
Total Generator Production: 40.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 26.2857
Total Consumer Surplus: 447.483
Total Surplus: 513.768
Figure 4.11: An inefﬁcient geography under externalities: Agglomeration but no
compactness84
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 24.25
Total Generator Production: 38.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 32.3333
Total Consumer Surplus: 458.338
Total Surplus: 528.671
Figure 4.12: Geography induces inefﬁcient fragmentation under externalities85
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.
Total Recipient Production: 25.875
Total Generator Production: 38
Total Producer Surplus for R: 32.5
Total Consumer Surplus: 458.338
Total Surplus: 528.838
Figure 4.13: Rearrangement is Pareto-improving: net gain in protected edges86
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.01
Total Recipient Production: 21.875
Total Generator Production: 40.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 30.0798
Total Consumer Surplus: 492.596
Total Surplus: 562.676
Figure 4.14: An efﬁcient outcome under externalities: low transport costs87
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.05
Total Recipient Production: 17.875
Total Generator Production: 45.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 27.0266
Total Consumer Surplus: 484.912
Total Surplus: 556.938
Figure 4.15: An efﬁcient outcomes under externalities: higher transport costs88
Figures 4.16 and 4.17 illustrate the impact of the initial conﬁguration of ﬁrms on the











. (The pure Von Thunen outcomes for these transport costs are illus-
trated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.) In this case, weak transport costs are not sufﬁcient to induce
agglomeration of recipients. The equilibrium pattern is clearly not Pareto optimal. The top
cluster could shift to the West, resulting in lower transportation costs for all recipients in the
cluster. The Southern cluster could also shift North, resulting in lower transport costs for all
and additional protected edges for a group of recipients. However, when transport costs are
sufﬁciently high (Figure 4.17), recipients agglomerate into an efﬁcient pattern, one which
minimizes transport costs and is relatively compact.
The ﬁnal example illustrates a landscape inﬂuenced by both protective geographic fea-
tures and the initial distribution of recipients. In Figure 4.18, in spite of a market located
in the Northwest corner of the landscape, recipients cluster quite far from the market. The
ﬁnal landscape is not efﬁcient. Figure 4.19 illustrates a welfare improving rearrangement
of ﬁrms.
As transport costs increase, (Figure 4.20) the single cluster of recipients moves towards
the market, but the shape of the cluster remains relatively inefﬁcient. The equilibrium out-
come in this case has an interesting feature. An initial rearrangement of ﬁrms, by moving
the two ﬁrms at the Southern edge of the landscape to the Northeast corner of the recipient
cluster, doesnotimprove total welfare. Thedecrease intransportation costsisinsufﬁcient to
offset the net loss of a protected border. However, if the market is allowed to evolve from89
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.01
Total Recipient Production: 22.25
Total Generator Production: 38.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 30.5329
Total Consumer Surplus: 492.194
Total Surplus: 560.727
Figure 4.16: A dispersed landscape under weak transport costs and externalities90
Initial  Landscape







Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.04
Total Recipient Production: 17.75
Total Generator Production: 44.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 26.5952
Total Consumer Surplus: 486.79
Total Surplus: 557.385
Figure 4.17: Higher transport costs induce efﬁciency91
this new, rearranged landscape, the ﬁnal outcome has higher total welfare than the initial
equilibrium. This result is illustrated in Figure 4.21. Still, in the ﬁnal outcome, all ﬁrms are
not better off than in the initial outcome. The ﬁrm located in cell (7,4), for example has lost
a protective edge and is therefore worse off. This example illustrates that side payments or
some other form of compensation may be required to achieve an efﬁcient arrangement of
ﬁrms,due to the potential for positive externalities between recipient ﬁrmsin this economy.
A general point of these examples is that landscapes impacted by edge-effect externali-
ties tend to bemoredispersed than landscapes without these externalities. Thus,edge-effect
externalities represent apossibleexplanation fortheemergence offragmented anddispersed
urban landscapes and for the dispersion of economic activity between geographic centers.
This explanation for dispersal represents an alternative to that produced by monopolistic
competition, which has received much attention in the economic geography literature of
late.
4.5 Conclusions and Extensions
4.5.1 Conclusions
Previous work examining the efﬁciency impacts of distance dependent spatial external-
ities has omitted an important dimension: the spatial arrangement of equilibrium land uses.
This chapter demonstrates that many equilibrium land use patterns are possible under these
“edge-effect externalities”. Some of these outcomes will be relatively efﬁcient, but others92
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.01
Total Recipient Production: 22.125
Total Generator Production: 40.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 29.8865
Total Consumer Surplus: 492.162
Total Surplus: 562.048
Figure 4.18: An inefﬁcient outcome under externalities due to the initial distribution93
Initial  Landscape







Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.01
Total Recipient Production: 21.75
Total Generator Production: 40.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 30.0263
Total Consumer Surplus: 492.479
Total Surplus: 562.505
Figure 4.19: A Pareto-improving rearrangement94
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.04
Total Recipient Production: 17.875
Total Generator Production: 44.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 27.0472
Total Consumer Surplus: 486.571
Total Surplus: 557.618
Figure 4.20: Transportation costs induce agglomeration under externalities, but not
efﬁciency95
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Demand and Supply for R
Final Firm Locations Profits
Equilibrium Results
Transportation costs: 0.04
Total Recipient Production: 18.75
Total Generator Production: 43.
Total Producer Surplus for R: 27.6372
Total Consumer Surplus: 487.442
Total Surplus: 558.08
Figure 4.21: A rearrangement leads to evolution of an efﬁcient landscape96
may be highly inefﬁcient. Due to inefﬁcient patterns of production, production by many re-
cipient ﬁrmswillberequired tomeetmarketdemand, leaving aninsufﬁciently smallamount
of land for production of other outputs. In many cases, a rearrangement of land uses which
is Pareto-improving is possible. In others, an initially welfare diminishing rearrangement
mayplace theeconomyonapathwhichleadstoanoutcome withhigher total welfare. How-
ever, there may be winners and losers in this economy, indicating the potential need for side
payments or other interventions.
Further, edge-effect externalities can induce equilibrium landscapes which are moredis-
persed than landscapes without externalities when transportation costs are present. This re-
sult sheds light on the emergence of fragmented and sprawling patterns of residential de-
velopment at the edges of cities. It also demonstrates that spatial externalities can provide
incentives similar to those of monopolistic competition for dispersing economic activity.
4.5.2 Agenda for future work
Analytical rigor This chapter demonstrates an important series of possible outcomes un-
der edge-effect externalities, but it does not characterize the conditions under which these
possible outcomes will occur. A greater exploration of the impacts of initial conditions, in-
cluding the number and pattern of recipient ﬁrms, the pattern and amount of protective geo-
graphic features, andthe location ofmarkets anddegree oftransport costs onﬁnal outcomes
is called for. Some questions to target:97
￿ Isthere arelationship between theefﬁciency oftheinitial landscape andtheefﬁciency
of the equilibrium landscape?
￿ Which landscape patterns represent stable economic equilibria? How do production
and market parameters impact the stability of landscape patterns?
￿ Under what conditions can an optimal equilibrium outcome be induced by an initially
suboptimal rearrangement of land uses?
Extending the model Three features of the economy outlined in this model encourage
land use transitions and the development of a relatively efﬁcient landscape. First, supply
is allowed to overshoot demand when market equilibria occur along ﬂat segments of the
demand curve. This high price incentive encourages pioneering ﬁrms to occupy new loca-
tions, encouraging the development of links between recipient clusters. The result, how-
ever, is that more recipients often enter the market than can be supported. When price falls
in the next round due to oversupply, the recipients in the more efﬁcient locations remain.
Second, there are no ﬁxed costs of changing land use type. In the real world, ﬁxed costs of
land use transitions are generally present. The introduction of ﬁxed costs would slow down
rates of land use transitions, and may substantially impact the efﬁciency of ﬁnal outcomes.
Finally, theexternality damage isassumedtodisperse completely inaonecell range, imply-
ing that an externality generator only impacts her immediate neighbors. In reality, distance-
dependent spatial externalities can either disperse very quickly or travel long distances. If
externality damage impacts non-contiguous neighbors, there may be fewer opportunities to98
form efﬁcient recipient clusters.
Several features of the model, however, imply that landscape transitions may be less
ﬂexible than is realistic. First, recipients take others’ locations asgiven, failing to anticipate
thattheirneighbors mayalsochange type, asdiscussedearlier. Anassumption withmorere-
alism would be to let each producer choose the type that maximizes proﬁts, given his neigh-
bor’s best response to that choice. Under this assumption, producers would be assumed to
look as far as their neighbors’ neighbors in making their decision. Producers would still be
boundedly rational, since they would have knowledge of only their local neighborhood.
Chapter 2 demonstrated that Coasean bargaining can theoretically lead to a Pareto opti-
mal outcome in the case where one recipient and one generator are present in the economy.
[32]. The current model does not allow for bargains either between recipients and genera-
torsorbetween recipients. Amodelthat includes thepossibility ofbargaining maytherefore
increase the efﬁciency of ﬁnal landscape outcomes.
Policy Interventions The current model can be used to examine the impact of common
policy mitigations on landscape outcomes. Pigovian taxes are the policy response that has
received the most attention in the literature [34, 11, 35]. However, no analysis has been
done examining the inﬂuence of taxes on equilibrium landscape outcomes. If they do not
actually encourage efﬁcient production patterns, then Pigovian taxes will not lead to Pareto
optimal outcomes in a competitive economy, contrary to the results of the current literature.
Pigovian taxes under spatial externalities prove extraordinarily complex, asthey depend99
on information on shadow values at differing points in space. Further, spatially heteroge-
neous taxes are not common in practice. The most common policy responses to edge-effect
externalities are zoning rules, mandatory buffer zones, and legal liability for damages. The
impacts ofthese three mechanisms onlandscape patterns could beexamined inanexpanded
model.
The Competitive Economy as a Search Mechanism Due to the impact of the spatial
arrangement of land uses on production possibilities, the social planner’s problem under
edge-effect externalities becomes highly non-linear. In a landscape with no geography and
notransportcosts,anefﬁcient landscape canbefoundbyminimizing bordersbetween recip-
ients and generators per unit area, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. However, the introduction
ofprotective geographic features andtransport costsbanishes easyanalytical solutions. The
current free-market model can be viewed as search algorithm which attempts to identify the
most efﬁcient pattern of production. Clearly, it is only partially successful, as demonstrated
by the many examples in this chapter. If Coasean bargaining or policy mitigations prove to
lead to efﬁcient landscapes, a competitive model could also serve as a search algorithm to
identify efﬁcient landscapes
￿
. Thismodeling tool could be particularly useful for landscape
planners attempting toidentify economically optimal habitat conﬁguration under ecological
edge effects.
￿
Credit goes to Jeffrey Williams for this insight.100
Making the Empirical Link An expanded model can be used to generate a series of
refutable hypotheses related to the impacts of production and market parameters, bargain-
ing, Pigovian taxes, buffer zones, liability rules, and zoning laws on equilibrium landscape
patterns, with the relative efﬁciency of ﬁnal landscape outcomes measured through descrip-
tive landscape statistics. An additional set of hypotheses which relate initial conditions to
ﬁnal outcomes can also be generated. Using Geographic Information Systems technology,
the same descriptive landscape statistics can be generated for real-world landscapes, pro-
viding empirical tests for the model’s hypotheses. This comprehensive approach is taken
by White and Engelen [38], who demonstrate using a cellular automaton model and a series
of digitized urban landscapes that urban landscape patterns can be represented by fractal
models.101
Chapter 5
Edge-Effect Externalities and California
Certiﬁed Organic Farmers
5.1 Introduction
Demand for organic foods has been increasing steadily in recent years, and production
of organic crops in California has steadily increased in response. Currently in California,
many growers choose to have their production processes certiﬁed by an external certiﬁca-
tion agency. For growers marketing their products to retail outlets, to food processors, and
for export markets, certiﬁcation is critical in order to obtain price premia. The certiﬁcation
process aimstoverify that growing practices are incompliance with state organic standards.
While certiﬁcation is currently not required, upon the likely adoption of the National Or-
ganic Standards Act, farm products labeled or represented as organic will require external102
certiﬁcation [36]. Themajority oforganic acreage inCalifornia iscertiﬁed organic, andCal-
ifornia Certiﬁed Organic Farmers is a major organic certiﬁer. In 1994, 80% of the acreage
representing 90% of total organic sales were certiﬁed. Of the certiﬁed acreage, 80% is cer-
tiﬁed by C.C.O.F. [19].
Certiﬁcation requires that an organic grower’s production site be free from potential
contamination by prohibited materials. One of the most probable sources of contamina-
tion come from spatial spillovers from surrounding land uses, including drift of prohib-
ited chemicals or possible cross-pollination with genetically modiﬁed crops.
￿
Therefore,
in cases where an inspector determines that contamination is possible from a neighboring
use, the organic producer is required to leave a twenty-ﬁve foot buffer zone between the
edge of his certiﬁed production site and the neighboring land use. Thus, C.C.O.F. growers
average cost of production is increased when borders are shared with an incompatible land
use, since the grower losses potentially productive land to buffer zones.
Organic growers may also incur production losses when located next to conventional
production sites due to incompatible production practices.
￿
Growers may have difﬁculties
maintaining populations of beneﬁcial insects at borders with conventional farms [14] and
managing pest migrations from surrounding conventional farms. Thus, they are potentially
impacted by edge-effect externalities which would increase their costs of production even
absent a buffer zone requirement.
￿
Growers are required to conduct periodic soil tests, and pesticide sales are carefully monitored and reg-
ulated in California, so the probability that an individual grower would use prohibited materiels on his or her
own land is low.
￿
Conventional producers may also incur such losses when located next to organic farms.103
This chapter tests the hypothesis that these potential negative spatial spillovers from
conventional farmsimpactthelocations andpatterns ofproduction ofcertiﬁed organicfarm-
ing operations. A series of landscape statistics which reﬂect geographic avoidance of costs
from maintaining buffer zones are presented. Using cross-sectional data on all agricultural
parcels in a two-county region of California’s Sacramento Valley, these statistics for both
certiﬁed organic parcels and comperable non-organic parcels are generated. Comparisions
demonstrate statistically signiﬁcant differences consistent withavoidance ofpotential buffers
zones by certiﬁed organic growers.
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, productivity of an organic landscape impacted by edge-
effect externalities will decrease non-linearly with landscape fragmentation. Further, con-
ﬂicting border per unit area is a broad empirical measure of the impact of edge effects. This
broad measure varies according to several geographic dimensions, some related to geome-
try of individual parcels and others related to landscape relationships between parcels. At
a landscape level, they include parcel contiguity and the distribution of land area between
parcels. At an individual parcel level, these dimensions include parcel size and shape.
The relatively abstract measure of conﬂicting border per unit area translates into con-
crete terms in the case of certiﬁed organic growers, since the costs of spatial spillovers can
be measured through land area in required buffer zones. Forcertiﬁed organic growers, costs
due to buffer zones will increase as the proportion of their production land in mandatory
buffer zones increases. Therefore, land in buffer zones as a percentage of total land area
is a broad empirical measure of the landscape efﬁciency of organic production sites with104
respect to avoidance of edge-effect externalities.
This broad empirical measure is sufﬁcient to test the hypothesis that organic parcels
differ from non-organic parcels in a manner consistent with avoidance of edge-effect ex-
ternalities. However, a breakdown of these differences along the possible dimensions of
fragmentation in the case of organic farms may reveal policy-relevant information. Is or-
ganic production concentrated in relatively few large contiguous parcels, even if many non-
contiguous parcels exist? Are organic parcels likely to be located next to other organic
parcels? Do organic farmers avoid buffer zone losses by farming larger parcels than non-
organic farms, implying that the optimal scale for an organic farm may be larger than for a
non-organic farm? Are organic parcels inherently less “edgy” than non-organic parcels?
Measures related to total border per unit area provide an incomplete description of the
potential costs related to buffer zones incurred by the organic grower. A parcel with a high
border per unit area ratio may not lose any production land to buffer zones if surrounding
land uses do not pose a threat to the integrity of organic production. Therefore, a parcel
bordering natural areas, another organic farm, or roadways which provide sufﬁcient buffers
from neighboring uses may be particularly attractive to organic growers. This possibility
raises additional policy-relevant questions related to organic parcels. Is an organic parcel
more likely to border a potentially compatible land use? If so, how much do surrounding
land uses contribute to lower potential costs from buffer zones on organic parcels?105
The Geography of Market Failure Inherent in this analysis of organic landscapes is the
question of whether parcel geography reﬂects both individual and cooperative cost-
minimization with respect to buffer zones. On an individual basis, an organic grower has
the ability to minimize buffer costs through geographically concentrating farm production,
farming parcels with a low ratio of border per unit area, locating next to other non-organic
but compatible land uses, and obtaining the cooperation of neighboring conventional farms
inavoiding drift. However, thepotential forreturns tocooperation between organic growers
exists as well. When organic growers farm parcels next to those farmed by other organic
growers, each grower gains the beneﬁts of a border where no buffer zone is required. Thus,
there are potential positive externalities between growers that can only be captured though
spatial clustering of organic farms.
Thequestion addressed bythischapter isnotsimplywhetherspatial spillovers fromcon-
ventional toorganicfarmsexist. Duetotheimpositionandenforcement ofmandatorybuffer
zones, these costs are concrete and documented. Rather, the chapter attempts to answer two
interlinked questions related to geographic aspects of market failure. The ﬁrst question is
whether costs related to buffer zones are sufﬁciently high to motivate spatial mitigation by
individual organic growers. This question relates to individual organic growers’ response
to negative spatial externalities and provides evidence as to whether spatial spillovers from
conventional to organic growers are an economically signiﬁcant policy issue. The second
question iswhether the potential positive externalities between organic growers, induced by
the existence of negative spillovers from conventional to organic growers, have led to the106
development of an efﬁcient landscape of separate organic farms. The answer to this ques-
tion may suggest whether external policy interventions related to whole-landscape planning
for zones of both organic and conventional production are indicated.
5.2 Spatial Information in Economic Analysis
The use of explicit spatial information in agricultural economics research is a new but
quicklydeveloping methodology. Thisspatialinformation isoftenderivedusingGeographic
Information Systems technology (G.I.S.), a computerized system which can both represent
and analyze spatial data. Forthe mostpart, the goal ofrecent empirical studies which utilize
information on spatial relationships has been to use economic and physical information to
predict land use. Often, land use transitions have been the focus. The general approach of
these papers has been to generate variables reﬂecting spatial relationships using geographic
information systems software. These variables then serve, along with other relevant infor-
mation, asexplanatory variables inalimited dependent variable model. Thegoalistomodel
how each factor contributes to the probability of ﬁnding land in a particular use. The degree
of disaggregation of land uses and use of spatial information varies with the studies.
Parks [33] estimates regional land use shares for developed, forested, and agricultural
lands in Georgia. Spatial information in this model is limited to regional location. Chomitz
and Gray [8] estimate an empirical model of land use in Belize based on the Von Thunen
hypothesis that land will be devoted to its highest valued use, which will be determined in107
part by transportation costs. They construct a weighted transport distance variable designed
toreﬂect transportation costs, andﬁndthat transport distance signiﬁcantly impacts the prob-
ability of ﬁnding land in an agricultural use. Neither of these papers explicitly considers the
impact of surrounding land uses on land use probabilities.
Palmquist,Roka,andVukina[29]explicitly testfortheinﬂuenceofadistance-dependent
spatial externality on property values. Using a hedonic model, they estimate the price gra-
dient ofresidential properties as afunction ofdistance fromhogoperations, a source of sub-
stantial negative externalities. Theyﬁndstatistically signiﬁcant increases inproperty values
as distance to the hog operations increases. They use the term “localized externality”.
Bockstael et al. [5, 12, 13] have constructed a detailed G.I.S.model of the Patuxent wa-
tershed in Maryland which predicts land use probabilities in a two-step process. First, land
use values are predicted using a hedonic model which includes variables reﬂecting spatial
relationships. Second, these values are used in a model predicting use conversions which
includes information on conversion costs and zoning constraints. Their spatial variables
include the proportion of land in a given neighborhood devoted to forest, agriculture, and
cropland, the length of conﬂicting edges between residential and commercial, industrial, or
mining uses, and the amount of the surrounding area in open space. Through these spatial
variables, their model explicitly tests for the inﬂuence ofpositive and negative spatial exter-
nalities on property values. Consistent with expectations, land values increase with the pro-
portion ofsurrounding openspace andpasture, anddecrease with the proportion in cropland
and the length of conﬂicting edges. Legget and Bockstael, utilizing the same G.I.S. model,108
link localized variations in water quality to their negative impacts on residential property
values [22].
Bockstael and her colleagues have begun to consider the impacts of landscape pattern
on property values and have analyzed the impact of some landscape ecology statistics such
asfractal dimension onproperty values [12,13]. However, they have notdeveloped explicit
theoretical predictions as to the impact of landscape pattern on property values.
Thischapter contributes tothe developing literature onempirical economic spatial anal-
ysis in two important aspects. First, this particular empirical application offers promise for
isolating and measuring impacts of negative externalities. In urban and residential settings,
anyone property ismostlikely inﬂuenced byahighnumber ofsurrounding landuses. Inthe
agricultural setting examined in this chapter, given that parcel sizes are large relative to the
dispersal radius of potential negative externalities, few surrounding uses potentially impact
aparticular parcel. Further, estimation ofproperty value impacts requires the useofhedonic
techniques. Inorderforhedonic estimates tocorrectly reﬂect theimpact ofsurrounding land
uses, all other relevant inﬂuences must be controlled for. In this study, externality impacts
can be measured directly through examination of buffer zone requirements.
The second signiﬁcant contribution of this chapter is to provide an explicit theoretical
motivation for hypotheses related to the economic impacts of landscape pattern. While the
potential for spatial externalities to produce non-convexities has been recognized for some
time [4], this chapter is the ﬁrst to explicitly demonstrate these impacts and to illustrate the
possiblegeometric dimensions ofnon-linear production loss. Further, thischapter istheﬁrst109
work to measure theoretical impacts related to edge-effects using real-world data. While a
comprehensive statistical model designed to predict the probability of ﬁnding an agricul-
tural parcel in organic production is not developed here, this work motivates the inclusion
of a variety of landscape statistics which reﬂect potential edge-effect externalities in such a
model and therefore lays the groundwork for model development.
￿
5.3 Data and Sampling Methods
Landscape statistics have been computed from a geographic information system con-
structed for this study. This G.I.S.includes maps of all agricultural parcels for a two-county
region in California’s Sacramento Valley. Maps of County 1 are from the 1994 cropping
season, and maps of County 2 are from 1997. These base layer parcel maps were obtained
from California’s Department of Water Resources.
Locations and parcel boundaries of organic farms certiﬁed by California Certiﬁed Or-
ganic Farmers were added to the base parcel maps. Certiﬁcation records containing in-
formation on parcel locations, surrounding land uses, and buffer zone requirements were
obtained via a research agreement with C.C.O.F.. According to the terms of this agree-
ment,locations andparcel boundaries ofindividual farms,aswellascropvarieties, numbers
of C.C.O.F. parcels, and acreage totals by county must remain conﬁdential. Therefore, no
maps of the organic landscape or explicit ﬁgures on parcel size or crops grown are included
in this study.
￿
A preliminary empirical speciﬁcation for such a model is presented in Appendix C110
In instances where organic parcel boundaries did not appear on the base parcel maps,
digitized copiesofcountyassessors’mapswereusedtocreate parcelboundaries. STATSGO
soil maps and related attribute data produced by the Natural Resource Conservation Service
were used to determine soil capability class codes. Soil class deﬁnitions are available from
the Natural Resource Conservation Service [37]. Map coverages from TIGER and Califor-
nia’s TEALE data center were also used to pinpoint locations of organic farms via street
addresses and section-township-range codes.
The Department of Water Resources base parcel layers report detailed information on
crop types, breaking down possible crops into a total of eight primary codes and seventy six
secondary codes. County 1 contains 2396 agricultural parcels representing 48 secondary
codes and County 2 contains 4308 agricultural parcels representing 61 secondary codes.
A cross-sectional sample of comparison parcels was selected by ﬁrst identifying soil
classes for the organic parcels. A list of unique combinations of soils classes and D.W.R.
secondary land use codes for crops grown was then constructed, excluding farmsteads and
natural vegetation occurring on certiﬁed organic land. Non-C.C.O.F. parcels sharing the
same combination of soil class and secondary crop classiﬁcation were then selected as a
comparison group.
￿ Once again, the speciﬁc values of the secondary crop classiﬁcations
are not revealed in order to maintain conﬁdentiality.
Buffer zone requirements for organic growers were instituted in 1990 after the passage
of the California Organic Foods act. Since that time, some growers have left organic certi-
￿
In some cases, soil class and crop combinations occurring for C.C.O.F. parcels were not represented in
the cross-sectional sample. C.C.O.F. parcels for these classes were included in tests of aggregate differences
in means, but were excluded from analysis which controlled for soil and crop types.111
ﬁcation due to conﬂicts with neighboring land uses, and others have relocated to more pro-
tected locations. These changes have occurred over a period of years, as growers and certi-
ﬁers have become aware of potential conﬂicts and have attempted to remedy them. Further,
many growers may initially have required buffers on many of their borders, but over time,
they have forged agreements with neighbors so that buffer zones are not required. The pro-
cessoflandscape change withresponsetobuffers, then, movesslowly, andtheorganic land-
scapes examined in this study, from 1994 and 1997, most likely represent landscapes which
are still in transition towards equilibrium. It is therefore likely that the incidence of buffers
in these landscapes is higher and concentration of organic production lower than would be
seen in a landscape where complete adjustment to buffer requirements had occurred.
￿
5.4 Results and Analysis
Thebroad empirical question addressed by this analysis iswhether edge-effect external-
ities have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the location and patterns of production of certiﬁed or-
ganic farms. As discussed above, an appropriate empirical measure of this result is whether
certiﬁed organic parcels have a lower ratio of land in mandatory buffer zones than would
comparable non-certiﬁed organic parcels. This ratio will vary both with parcel geometry
and with the proportion of land surrounding the parcel in an incompatible land use. A se-
ries of statistics reﬂecting parcel geometry and neighboring land uses are presented below.
￿
Base data for a time series of organic parcels exist, and examination of landscapechangesover time is a
goal of future work.112
The potential production impacts of variation in each geographic dimension are illustrated
by linking variations in parcel geography to percentage of area lost to buffer zones.
5.4.1 Parcel Geometry
Thefollowing examples illustrated the impacts ofdifferences inarea concentration, par-
celcontiguity, parcelsize,andparcel shapeundertheassumptionthatbuffersarerequired on
all exposed borders. Thisillustration outlines possible lossesto buffer zones independent of
neighboring land uses. For several of these statistics, borders between contiguous parcels
are dissolved and statistics are calculated for the resulting larger parcels. These statistics
illustrate the impacts of geographic clustering of organic farms and reﬂect possible bene-
ﬁts from spatial agglomeration of compatible land uses. For these examples, both parcels
farmed by the same grower and parcels farmed by separate growers are agglomerated. This
aggregation unfortunately obscures some possible insights regarding individual vs. cooper-
ative spatial mitigation. Ifone large grower’s farm consists of many small parcels, statistics
may indicate that production is quite geographically concentrated, even though no coordi-
nation between growers has occurred. However, the aggregation is necessary due to lim-
its on data availability for non-organic farms. While each organic parcel can be linked to
the management of a particular grower, the non-organic parcels cannot be grouped by farm
manager.
Reporting of statistics at the level of contiguous C.C.O.F. parcels does address a poten-
tial problem regarding the lack of farm-level data, however. If C.C.O.F. farms were simply113
more diversiﬁed than non-C.C.O.F. farms in terms of crops grown in a given year, many
of the statistics reported here would indicate differences between the parcels. For instance,
C.C.O.F.parcels wouldbebothsmallerandwouldbemorelikely toborder anotherC.C.O.F.
parcel. However, differences between contiguous clusters of C.C.O.F. parcels and individ-
ual non-C.C.O.F. parcels could not be due simply to a higher level of crop diversity on
C.C.O.F. farms. This comparison goes beyond a comparison of C.C.O.F. farms to non-
C.C.O.F. farms since it compares C.C.O.F. farms to non-C.C.O.F. parcels.
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Figure 5.1: Concentration of Production Area114
Concentration Independent of the number and arrangement of parcels in the landscape,
the concentration of area among parcels will impact landscape productivity. Even if many
non-contiguous parcels exist, theproduction landscape maybefairly efﬁcient ifthemajority
ofproduction isconcentrated inrelatively fewparcels. Thisresultisillustrated inFigure5.1.
The panel on the left illustrates the least efﬁcient landscape, holding the number of parcels
and geographic arrangement of parcels ﬁxed. Moving to the right, as production becomes
more concentrated, edge per unit area and therefore losses from buffer zones decrease.
Inalandscape context, “evenness” indices measurerelative landscape concentration, in-
dependent of the number of parcels [24]. Some intuition for these measures can be gained
through a comparison to the familiar Herﬁndahl index, used by economists to measure dis-
tribution of market share and therefore indirectly to measure market power. The value of
the Herﬁndahl index on its own will vary with the number of ﬁrms in the marketplace even
if the structure of the distribution of shares between ﬁrms remains the same. The parallel to
the Herﬁndahl index in landscape ecology is a “diversity index”, which measures the distri-
bution ofarea between land-use classes, notcontrolling forthe number ofdiffering land-use
classes.
TheHerﬁndahl index can be normalized to control for the number of ﬁrmsin the market
































ness index, similarly control for the number of land-use classes in a landscape. They are
designed to reﬂect possible dominance of a landscape by particular land-use classes, con-
trolling for the total number of land-use classes. Rather than calculate these statistics using
land-use classes, the statistics are calculated treating each separate parcel as a class. There-
fore, they reﬂect the concentration ofproduction amongC.C.O.F.and non-C.C.O.F.parcels,















































Group County 1 County 2
Contiguous C.C.O.F. 0.808 0.812
Contiguous Comparison 0.855 0.631
Table 5.1: Shannon’s Evenness Index116
Group County 1 County 2
Contiguous C.C.O.F. 0.929 0.933
Contiguous Comparison 0.983 0.935
Table 5.2: Simpson’s Evenness Index
Results for the evenness indices are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. These measures
are summary statistics foran entire landscape and cannot be calculated on a parcel by parcel
basis. Therefore, statistical comparisonsbetweenC.C.O.F.andnon-C.C.O.F.indices arenot
easily computable.
￿
Further, these statistics are reported on a county by county basis, since
aggregation of the two counties would imply that the neighboring landscapes remained the
samefrom1994to1997. Forbothcounties, manyﬁrmsbothentered andexited certiﬁcation
during this time period.
For County 1, C.C.O.F. parcels exhibit more concentration than non-C.C.O.F. parcels.
For County 2, results differ for each index number. While spatial concentration of produc-
tion may be efﬁcient in terms of edge effects, it may not make economic sense given size
differences between organic and non-organic parcels. For organic farms, a highly concen-
trated landscape would also imply a high variance in parcel size. Since the average organic
farm issmaller than the average non-organic farm, a high variance in parcel size would nec-
essarily imply theexistence ofsomeverysmallfarmsgeographically isolated fromother or-
ganic farms. These small farms are not likely to be economically efﬁcient, especially given
￿
One possible way of drawing a statistical comparison would be to compute indices for smaller, overlap-
ping regions, then compare these indices statistically. Further, it is possible that a relationship exists between
thesestatisticsandresultsofaspatiallyautoregressivestatisticalmodel. Thisisatopicforfutureinvestigation.117
the ﬁxed costs of organic certiﬁcation. Thus, it is not surprising that small differences are
seem in geographic concentration of production.
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Figure 5.2: Parcel Contiguity
Parcel Contiguity A simple measure of geographic dispersion of land uses is the num-
ber of parcels located next to another parcel in a similar use relative to the total number of
contiguous parcels. In Figure 5.2, different arrangements of four equal-area parcels are il-
lustrated. Themostefﬁcient arrangement oftheparcels, intermsoflandlosttobufferzones,
is to have all four parcels grouped together. As the number of separate clusters of parcels
increases, a higher proportion of land islost to buffer zones. The least efﬁcient arrangement
of production is to have all parcels geographically dispersed.
Figure5.2providesanillustration ofthepotential forpositive externalities betweengrow-
ers. If the optimal scale for an organic grower is small, each of the four plots may be under118
separate management. It would be most efﬁcient for the parcels to be located next to one
another. However, due to potential for positive externalities between growers, this arrange-
mentoflandusesmaynotoccur inthefreemarket[31]. Further, thesepotential externalities
are asymmetric. For example, the grower in the Southeast corner of this production land-
scape would much prefer the parcel conﬁguration in the ﬁrst panel to that in the third. Yet,
the grower located at the Northwest parcel in the cluster of growers in the ﬁrst panel would
be indifferent between that outcome and the least efﬁcient outcome in the third panel. This
Northwest grower is imposing positive externalities on the Southeast grower by providing
a protected border. More important, since damages from the edge effects are spatially het-
erogeneous, beneﬁts fromspatial agglomeration areasymmetric. Thegroweroccupying the
Southeast parcel receives highest beneﬁts, followed bythegrowersoccupying theNortheast
and Southwest parcels.
Group County 1 County 2
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.59 0.20
Comparison Group 0.50 0.06
Table 5.3: Ratio of Contiguous Parcels to Total Parcels
Results related to parcel contiguity are presented in Table 5.3. For both counties, the
landscape ofnon-C.C.O.F.farmsexhibits morecontiguity thanthelandscape ofnon-C.C.O.F.
farms. There are two possible explanations for these results. The ﬁrst is that the number of
farms in the comparison group is substantially higher than for the C.C.O.F. parcels. There-119
fore these farms dominate the landscape, are much more likely to share borders, and there-
fore are much more likely to form contiguous clusters. The second explanation relates to
the surroundings of each farm. The narrow valleys of these two counties are areas very at-
tractive to organic farmers, and there is a high proportion of natural vegetation and natural
waterways. Perhaps these protective landscapes connect C.C.O.F. parcels. If these protec-
tive landscapes are included in the analysis, C.C.O.F. parcels may exhibit more contiguity.
Two extensions to the current analysis of parcel contiguity are suggested. The ﬁrst is to de-
velop acontiguity statistic that controls fortherelative proportion ofthe landscape occupied
by each use. The second is to examine landscape contiguity including protective land uses.
Statistical Tests Alloftheremainingstatistics discussedcanbecalculated onbothawhole-
landscape and a parcel by parcel basis. Therefore, formal statistical comparisons can be
done between C.C.O.F. and non-C.C.O.F. parcels. Two simple approaches are taken. For
the ﬁrst, unweighted parcel means are compared using t-tests and assuming unequal vari-
ancesbetween C.C.O.F.andnon-C.C.O.F.parcels. Forthesecondapproach, meansforeach
statistic, conditioned on the parcel’s crop type and soil class combination and the parcel’s
certiﬁed organic status, are computed using simple linear regressions. The general regres-












￿ Value of spatial statistic
￿
￿ D1-D39: Soil class / crop type combination dummies
￿
￿ Vector of estimated conditional means for each conventional soil / crop type
CCOF
￿ Dummy variable for certiﬁed organic status
￿
￿ Average deviation from conventional conditional mean for C.C.O.F. parcels
￿
￿ Error term
Each of the 39 crop type / soil class dummies reﬂects a unique Department of Water Re-
sources agricultural secondary code and STATSGO soil class. An example would be “pro-
cessing tomatoes on Class 2 soil”. Due to the conﬁdentiality agreement under which the
C.C.O.F. data were obtained, the crop types for these dummies cannot be individually re-
ported. These dummies are included solely to control for soil and crop type.
For each of these regressions, the coefﬁcient on the soil class and crop type dummy rep-
resents the conditional mean for a non-C.C.O.F.parcel forthat soil / crop type, and the coef-
ﬁcient on the C.C.O.F.dummy represents the average deviation from this conditional mean
for all soil / crop types for that statistic. If the parameter
￿ is signiﬁcantly different from
zero, thehypothesis ofdifferences between C.C.O.F.andnon-C.C.O.F.parcels issupported.
These preliminary regressions, estimated through ordinary least squares, do not correct
for very probable spatial relationships in the error structure, and therefore the standard er-
rorsare mostlikely biased. However, somespatial correlation will be controlled forby con-
trolling for soil type and crop. Further, substantial positive spatial autocorrelation is most121
likely present, and this positive autocorrelation would reduce the variance between parcels
and therefore result in higher signiﬁcance levels for coefﬁcient estimates. The regression
approach is used only for parcel by parcel comparisons, since groups of C.C.O.F. parcels
will not have a unique soil type / crop code.
Varying Average Parcel Size 
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Figure 5.3: Average Parcel Size
Parcel Size Productivity of a landscape with losses due to edge effects will vary with the
number of parcels per unit area, or, equivalently, with average parcel size. Figure 5.3 il-
lustrates this phenomenon. Holding area ﬁxed, as the number of parcels in the landscape
increases, the proportion of borders to total area and therefore the proportion of land lost to
buffer zones increases.
Table 5.4 reports average parcel sizes for both counties, and Table 5.14 reports regres-
sion results. In Table 5.4, the t-statistics and P-values for C.C.O.F. parcels and contiguous
parcels refer to tests of differences between the means for these groups and the mean for122
Group Mean S.D. t-stat P-value
C.C.O.F. Parcels 60836 85514 26.0997 0.0001
Contiguous C.C.O.F. Parcels 239289 382197 1.9733 0.0535
Comparison Group 344432 580046
Table 5.4: Differences in Average Parcel Size
the comparison parcels. For instance, the t-statistic for the test that the average C.C.O.F.
parcel is smaller than the average comparison parcel is 26.0997, indicating that differences










level. To maintain conﬁdentiality, sample sizes and degrees of
freedom are not reported for t-tests. The total sample size used for all regressions is 4249.
Statistics for both individual parcels and for agglomerated groups of C.C.O.F. farms are re-
ported. Both simple t-tests and regressions indicate that average parcel size for C.C.O.F.
parcels issigniﬁcantly smaller than fornon-C.C.O.F.parcels. Regression estimates indicate
that the average C.C.O.F.parcel issmaller than the average non-C.C.O.F.parcel byapproxi-
mately20.02hectares. Thisimpliesthatinthisdimension, C.C.O.F.parcels aresigniﬁcantly
more vulnerable to proportional losses of productive land frombuffer zones. While clusters
of contiguous C.C.O.F.farms occupy much more area, these clusters of parcels are still sig-
niﬁcantly smaller than non-C.C.O.F. individual parcels, meaning that in many cases, entire
C.C.O.F. farms are smaller than individual non-C.C.O.F. parcels.
On a parcel by parcel level, these results would also be consistent with a higher opti-
mal level of geographic diversity for organic farms. Geographic diversity may reduce risk
for the organic grower by creating an ecologically resilient landscape. It is also possible123
that diversity is beneﬁcial to growers from a marketing perspective. Many of these growers
market their products at farmers markets or through subscription agriculture, and in each of
thesecases, beingabletoofferawiderange ofproductsmayprovide amarketing advantage.
However, ahigher level ofdiversity per acre is nota sufﬁcient explanation for differences in
sizebetween contiguous C.C.O.F.parcels andnon-C.C.O.F.parcels. Apossible explanation
is that optimal scale for an organic farm is smaller than for a conventional farm.
% BUF = 0.3
Varying Height / Width Ratio
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Figure 5.4: Parcel Shape
ParcelShape Parcel shapewillimpactpotential lossesduetoedgeeffects. Ashapewhich
is most compact (a shape with equal length sides for angled shapes and a circle for continu-
ousshapes) willminimize edge perunit area. InFigure5.4,asquareparcel shapeminimizes
lossesfrombufferzones. Astheparcel becomeslongerandmorenarrow,holding areaﬁxed,
the proportion of land lost to buffer zones increases.
Tables 5.5 and 5.15 present results on average parcel compactness for the three parcel124
Group A-W M.S.I. Mean S.D. t-stat P-value
C.C.O.F. Parcels 1.270 1.287 0.226 4.3427 0.0001
Contiguous C.C.O.F. Parcels 1.329 1.302 0.172 2.3362 0.0229
Comparison Group 1.458 1.359 0.365
Table 5.5: Differences in Parcel Shape
categories. The statistics reported compare the perimeter to area ratio for each parcel to the
value of the ratio for a circular shape of the same area [24]. The area-weighted mean shape

































￿ is compared between
parcels. Both simple mean comparisons and regression results indicate that parcel shapes
for C.C.O.F. parcels are more compact, indicating that C.C.O.F. parcels are inherently less
vulnerable in this dimension to losses from buffer zones. Interestingly, contiguous clusters
of C.C.O.F.parcels are less compact than individual parcels. This result may be a reﬂection
of slow transitions to organic production in many “mixed” (organic and conventional) oper-
ations, which tend to occur on a parcel by parcel basis, implying irregularly shaped organic
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Figure 5.5: Neighboring Land Uses126
5.4.2 Neighboring Land Uses
Inaddition toparcel geometry, thetotal amountoflandinmandatory bufferswilldepend
on the proportion of borders on which buffers are actually required. There are several ways
in which C.C.O.F. growers can avoid leaving buffer zones along a given border. If a buffer
zone is not required on a given border, for purposes of this chapter, that border is referred to
as “protected”. Figure 5.5 illustrates potential sources of protected borders, using a single
parcel and considering only neighboring land usesdirectly sharing aborder with the organic
parcel. In the ﬁrst panel, all neighboring uses are conﬂicting uses, and buffers are required
on all borders. In the second panel, two borders are shared with another C.C.O.F. farm and
natural vegetation, andnobuffersarerequired onthese borders. Inthelast panel, inaddition
tosharingtwoborderswithnon-conﬂicting uses,thegrowerhasnegotiated agreements with
neighboring conventional farms so that buffers are maintained on the neighbor’s land. In
the ﬁrst case, the neighboring conventional grower has provided a written statement that he
will not use any prohibited substances within twenty-ﬁve feet of the border of the C.C.O.F.
parcel. Inthesecondcase,theorganicgrowerhasagreed tomanageatwenty-ﬁve footbuffer
on the conventional neighbor’s land as organic. These last two cases, actual occurrences
for many C.C.O.F.farms, are consistent with the theoretical operation of a liability rule and
Coasean bargaining under edge-effect externalities, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. In the
following examples, statistics reﬂecting each of these three cases are illustrated.
The ﬁrst case is a worst-case scenario regarding buffers. The second reﬂects estimated
buffers and, given data availability, is the only practical means of comparing land lost to127
buffers between C.C.O.F. and non-C.C.O.F. parcels. Information on actual buffer zone re-
quirements for C.C.O.F.farms is contained in the C.C.O.F.inspectors’ reports and has been
added to the G.I.S. constructed for this project. Since non-organic parcels haven’t been in-
spected, it isunknown exactly what buffer zones wouldbe required onthese parcels. There-
fore, the type of surrounding land use is used as a proxy for the probable imposition of a
mandatory buffer zone. This facilitates comparisons between C.C.O.F. and non-C.C.O.F.
parcels which reﬂect their potential vulnerability to buffer zones. Proximity to roads and
waterways will soon be added to this estimate to increase its accuracy. In the third case,
the actual incidence of buffer zones in C.C.O.F. parcels is examined. This analysis both
illustrates the extent to which C.C.O.F. farms are able to avoid potential buffer zones and
facilitates an assessment of the accuracy of estimating buffer zone requirements using sur-
rounding land uses as a proxy.
Buffers on All Borders In order to summarize the inherent vulnerability of parcels of
each type and to provide a frame of reference for statistics on estimated and actual buffer
zones, buffer incidences are calculated assuming that buffers are required on all borders.
Descriptive statistics and simple tests of mean differences are reported in Table 5.6, and re-
gression results are reported in 5.16.
￿ The total proportion reported in Table 5.6 is a whole-
landscape measure and represents the actual proportion of the entire production landscape
￿
Thisand other remainingregressionsarerun using proportionsas dependentvariables. While these vari-
ablesarecontinuous,avoidingbiasedstandarderrorswhichoccurwithlimiteddependentvariablemodels,the
variables are bounded between zero and one. Ordinary least squares regressions in these cases do not bound
estimatesof dependentvariablesto bewithin thisrange. Apossibleresponsetothisproblemwouldhavebeen
totransformthedependentvariableusingalogistictransformation. However,inthecurrentformat, regression
coefﬁcients are easily interpreted, so that transformation was not done.128
potentially in buffers. The “mean” is a per-parcel average. C.C.O.F. parcels are inherently
morevulnerable tolossesfrombufferzones. Theaverage C.C.O.F.parcelwouldlose12.05%
of its land to buffer zones, while the average non-ccof parcel would lose only 5.23%. Re-
gression results controlling for crop and soil type estimate that the average C.C.O.F. parcel
would lose 6.87% more land to buffers. This higher level of inherent vulnerability is most
likely due to the fact that the C.C.O.F. parcels are much smaller than non-C.C.O.F. parcels.
Since buffer zones are never required between C.C.O.F. parcels, the percentage of land po-
tentially losttobufferzonesontheoutsidebordersofcontiguous clustersofC.C.O.F.parcels
is reported. Clusters of contiguous parcels are inherently less vulnerable than individual
parcels and are not statistically more vulnerable than non-C.C.O.F. parcels, indicating that
some beneﬁts have been captured through concentration of production.
Group Total prop. Mean S.D. t-stat P-value
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.1205 0.2178 0.1178 12.4602 0.0001
Contiguous C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.0587 0.1246 0.0846 0.8907 0.3770
Comparison Group 0.0523 0.1142 0.1006
Table 5.6: Proportion of Land in Buffer Zones, Buffers on All Borders
Buffers with Conﬂicting Land uses To create an empirical proxy for the imposition of
a buffer zone requirement, a list of “compatible” land uses was compiled, drawing from
C.C.O.F. inspectors’ reports. The deﬁnition included parcels in natural vegetation, natural
riparian areas, natural waterways, pasture lands, fallow cropland, andother C.C.O.F.farms.129
Three sets of statistics are presented in Tables 5.7, 5.17, 5.8, 5.18, 5.9, and 5.19. The ﬁrst
report the percentage of borders on which buffers would be required. An alternative inter-
pretation ofthisstatistic forthe wholelandscape proportion isthatit represents the probabil-
ity that a border is shared with at least one incompatible land use. The parcel level propor-
tion represents the average percentage of a parcel’s border on which buffers are maintained.
Thesestatistics willbeindependent oftheinherent vulnerability oftheparcels tolossesfrom
buffers, since they don’t depend on the ratio of border per area. The second statistics report
the percentage of total land that would be lost to mandatory buffers. These statistics reﬂect
each parcel’s inherent vulnerability to losses of productive land. The third set of statistics
report the proportion ofpotential buffer land actually in mandatory buffers. These statistics,
like the ﬁrst set, are largely independent of buffer vulnerability. Since buffers are never re-
quired oninternal borders with other C.C.O.F.parcels, the statistics forcontiguous C.C.O.F.
parcels reﬂect the protective inﬂuences of non-C.C.O.F. compatible land uses, such as nat-
ural vegetation and waterways.
Allstatisticsdemonstrate thatlocating nexttocompatible landusesisanimportantsource
of protected borders for C.C.O.F.farms. C.C.O.F.farms are much less likely to share a bor-
der with a conﬂicting land use. C.C.O.F. parcels share an average of around 29% of their
borders with an incompatible use while non-C.C.O.F. parcels border non-compatible uses
on an average of around 96% of their borders. Regression results indicate that the aver-
age C.C.O.F. parcel is 68% less likely to share a border with an incompatible use. C.C.O.F.
parcels also lose a lower percentage of their land to buffer zones per parcel than would non-130
C.C.O.F. parcels. The average C.C.O.F. parcel would lose an estimated 5.67% of its land
to buffer zones, while the average non-C.C.O.F. parcel would lose 8.42%. Regression esti-
mates indicate that C.C.O.F. parcels lose around 4.9% less land to buffers. In terms of the
amount of land potentially in buffers zones (land within the buffer zone distance of a bor-
der), C.C.O.F. farms are estimated to maintain buffers on around 33% of this land, while
non-C.C.O.F. parcels are estimated to maintain buffers on around 77%. These results are
even more striking in light of the inherent higher level of vulnerability of C.C.O.F. parcels
to losses from buffer zones described in Tables 5.6 and 5.16.
Group Total prop. Mean S.D. t-stat P-value
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.3299 0.2875 0.2700 36.1138 0.0001
Contiguous C.C.O.F. 0.5343 0.5095 0.3443 9.6847 0.0001
Comparison Group 0.9723 0.9681 0.1355
Table 5.7: Buffers Required from Incompatible Land Uses
Group Total prop. Mean S.D. t-stat P-value
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.0310 0.0567 0.0652 5.8406 0.0001
Contiguous C.C.O.F. 0.0386 0.0840 0.0752 0.0194 0.9846
Comparison Group 0.0404 0.0842 0.0850
Table 5.8: Proportion of Land in Buffers, Incompatible Uses131
Group Total prop. Mean S.D. t-stat P-value
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.3397 0.2979 0.2730 24.2078 0.0001
Contiguous C.C.O.F. 0.6557 0.6619 0.2924 2.6500 0.0106
Comparison Group 0.7737 0.7691 0.2873
Table 5.9: Estimated Proportion of Potential Buffer Land in Buffers
5.4.3 Actual C.C.O.F. Buffer Requirements
Using information from C.C.O.F. inspectors’ reports, statistics on actual buffer zones
werecomputed. Inthiscase, agreements between neighborsaswellasprotection fromcom-
patible neighboring uses are accounted for. Additionally, cases where roadways and minor
waterways provided protection areincluded.
￿
Theseresults arepresented inTables 5.10and
5.11. For both counties, these values are substantially lower than those forsurrounding land
use only. This indicates that roads, waterways, and cooperative agreements are important
factors in avoiding mandatory buffers. Growers actually maintain buffers on only around
19% of their borders, much less than the estimate of 33% based on surrounding land uses.
Further, the low values reported in these ﬁgures illustrate that C.C.O.F. growers manage to
substantially avoid losses of productive land from buffer zones. Therefore, they strongly
support the hypothesis that avoidance of buffer zones is an important factor in determining
locations and patterns of production for certiﬁed growers.




The D.W.R. coverages include only major roadways and waterways. Information for actual C.C.O.F.
parcels comes from inspector’s reports.
￿
Valuesdo not sum to 100 percent. Conditions are potentially overlappingand not exhaustive. For exam-
ple, a parcel may border natural vegetation and be separated from this vegetation by a creek. In some cases,132
Group Total prop. Mean S.D.
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.1844 0.1320 0.2191
Table 5.10: Actual Proportion of C.C.O.F. Borders with Buffers
Group Total prop. Mean S.D.
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.02310 0.02083 0.03965
Table 5.11: Actual Proportion of C.C.O.F. Land in Mandatory Buffers
Group Total prop. Mean S.D.
C.C.O.F. Parcels 0.1895 0.1349 0.2222
Table 5.12: Actual Proportion of Potential Buffer Land in Buffers133
ing land uses and agreements with neighbors provided protection from mandatory buffer
zones. Shared borders with other organic parcels were the most common source of pro-
tection. It is important to note that in both counties, few instances of organic farms under
different management located next to one another occurred. Of all borders shared with an-
other organic parcel, only 2.9 % of these borders were shared with another organic grower.
Thus, the high proportion of protected borders for County 1 related to bordering another or-
ganic parcel (44.4 %) occur due to the fact that many organic farms in this region contain
a large number of contiguous plots of different crops. Borders with natural vegetation and
waterways were also important sources of protection. Roads as buffers were important for
both counties. Negotiated agreements, including letters from neighbors and management
of a buffers on the neighbor’s land, were also a source of protection, but these negotiated
agreements overall represented a low proportion of protected buffers.
Source of Protection Proportion
Organic Neighbor 0.4451
Bordered by Natural Vegetation 0.2210
Road provided buffer 0.1435
Bordered Natural Waterway 0.1032
Letter from neighbor 0.0548
Managed buffer for Neighbor 0.0225
Table 5.13: Reasons for Protected Borders for C.C.O.F. Parcels
a reason for waiving a buffer zone requirement was not given by the inspector.134
5.4.4 Landscape Analysis: Extensions
The empirical results presented here, focused mainly at the individual parcel level, lay
the groundwork for more comprehensive analysis. Several questions related to the land-
scape of organic producers remain. These questions focus on the development of organic
neighborhoods. Factors other than the beneﬁts of shared borders, such as sharing of infor-
mation, expertise, and processing infrastructure, may lead to geographic concentration of
organic production. This concentration could be measured through spatial statistics which
compare the distribution ofdistances between C.C.O.F.plots to the distribution of distances
betweennon-C.C.O.F.plots. Thisanalysisalsoexcludes theinﬂuence oftransportation costs.
Therefore, the set of implications developed in Chapter 4 regarding interactions between
transportation costs and edge-effect externalities have not been examined. These interac-
tions have implications for the values of spatial clustering indices. If edge-effect external-
ities were completely unimportant, C.C.O.F.parcels would beexpected to be uniformly dis-
persedradially aroundmarketingsites. IftransportcostsareanimportantfactorforC.C.O.F.
location, and edge-effect externalities are also important, the radial distribution of C.C.O.F.
parcels would not be uniform, but would exhibit spatial clustering, holding distance from
markets constant. If transport costs prove insigniﬁcant and spatial clustering is evident, this
would imply that beneﬁts from externality avoidance exceeded beneﬁts from lower trans-
port costs.135
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The statistics presented provide evidence that ﬁnding a location protected from poten-
tially conﬂicting uses is an important factor for certiﬁed organic farmers. Parcels farmed by
certiﬁed growers,whileinherently morevulnerable toproportional lossesofproductive land
from buffer zones than comparable non-certiﬁed organic parcels, appear quite protected
from losses due to buffer zones. On ﬁrst glance this appears to be an optimistic ﬁnding.
A positive interpretation is that buffer zone regulations are not having substantial impacts
on the economic viability of organic production. A naive interpretation would be that exter-
nality impacts are mitigated through the efforts of organic growers, implying that welfare
losses due to the spatial externalities are negligible.
However, this optimistic interpretation fails to consider this case in the context of theo-
retical results related to externalities in general andedge-effect externalities inparticular. In
theory, market price distortions occur under externalities, with the result of too much pro-
duction from the externality-generation use occurring, and too little production occurring
from the externality-receiving use [4]. In the case of edge-effect externalities, this price
distortion takes a particular form. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, in a free-market outcome
without complete bargaining, the value ofoperating free fromtheexternality found inapro-
tected location will be capitalized into the market rental rate of land. In this particular case,
C.C.O.F. growers’ bids for protected location will be increased by the value of the dam-
age avoided. These relatively higher land rental rates for organic producers may push less
efﬁcient organic growers out of the certiﬁed organic market. The loss of these growers re-136
ﬂects the lower production by the organic industry theoretically expected under external-
ities. As also noted in Chapter 2, the avoidance behavior of potential externality damage
demonstrated by C.C.O.F. farmers does not imply that market distortions due to externality
damage are reduced. Externality avoidance does not equal externality mitigation [11, 32].
However, this avoidance behavior by C.C.O.F. growers may contribute to a relatively
efﬁcient landscape of organic farming. Chapter 4 demonstrated that under edge-effect ex-
ternalities, while the free market may lead to globally inefﬁcient patterns of production, lo-
cally, parcel geometry will be relatively efﬁcient. More speciﬁcally, production may be dis-
persed among several geographically isolated production sites, but production patterns may
evolve which minimize conﬂicting borders with incompatible uses at individual sites. This
theoretical prediction appears to hold in the case of C.C.O.F. farmers. Farmers do not ap-
pear to have captured gains from cooperation, since very few C.C.O.F. farms share borders
with other C.C.O.F.farms. Yet, individual farmers appear to be very successful at avoiding
losses of productive land from buffer zones.
The failure of C.C.O.F. farms to capture potential beneﬁts from spatial agglomeration
indicates that policies which encourage the development of organic landscapes may be ben-
eﬁcial. Both certiﬁed organic producers and producers using conventional methods could
potentially beneﬁt fromaspatial arrangement ofproduction which minimizes potential con-
ﬂicts. Precedents exist for such policies in California in cases where production process for
two crops are incompatible. For example, in 1997 in Glenn county, production of cotton
was limited to a particular zone of the county to protect existing olive trees from contami-137
nation by verticillium wilt [9]. Buffer zone regulations are also often imposed and enforced
through county agricultural commissions. In discussions with organic farmers regarding
possible policies toencourage thedevelopment oforganic landscapes, growershaveempha-
sized that successful policies, from their perspective, would be both ﬂexible and voluntary.
Possible policies might include preferential tax structures for land in organic uses or subsi-
dies to growers during the three-year transition period to establish organic certiﬁcation.
￿
￿
To evaluate growers’ potential response to such policies, a comprehensive empirical
model designed to predict factors which increase the probability of successful organic pro-




The model would also account for proximity to potential marketing
outlets, such as metropolitan areas, local farmers’ markets, and organic processing plants.
Soil quality would also be included as an explanatory variable.
In addition, many of the statistics described in this chapter would serve as dependent
variables designed to reﬂect the attractiveness of a particular parcel in terms of its potential
to avoid costs from mandatory buffers. For each individual parcel, statistics on parcel size
and shape would be included. In order to account for surrounding land uses and neighbor-




spatial lag greater than one, this structure has the advantage that the impact of local, but not
contiguous, organic farms may be accounted for. While few C.C.O.F. farms in the data ex-
amined are located next to one another, signiﬁcant spatial clustering ofthese farms is appar-
￿
￿
Transition subsidies are used in Sweden to encourage entry into the organic farming industry [23].
￿
￿
Reliable data on prices for organic products are lacking at this point in time.
￿
￿
A preliminary empirical speciﬁcation for such a model is presented in Appendix C.138
ent. There are many reasons why such clustering might occur. Neighboring organic farm-
ers may share specialized expertise, and therefore having organic neighbors may increase
a grower’s chances of succeeding at organic farming. With many local organic neighbors,
conventional neighbors may be more familiar with the requirements for organic farming,
and as a result, fewer conﬂicts may occur. Conventional growers with successful organic
neighbors may decide to emulate their success and therefore might be more likely to transi-
tion to organic production. Estimation of a complete model, controlling for the factors de-
scribed above, would reveal whether spatial correlations exist independent of the inﬂuence
of protective locations. If these spatial correlations are found, it may imply that positive
returns to spatial scale in organic agriculture are present for reasons beyond beneﬁts from
externality avoidance. This result would further strengthen the rational for policies which
encourage development of regions of organic production.139
Variable Est. Parameter S.E. T-stat P-value
D1 149144 148845.15157 1.002 0.3164
D2 63597 76313.452012 0.833 0.4047
D3 69042 146636.24236 0.471 0.6378
D4 121221 186953.40828 0.648 0.5168
D5 182042 39815.299504 4.572 0.0001
D6 164674 25831.598653 6.375 0.0001
D7 147600 176253.69887 0.837 0.4024
D8 89057 79776.739097 1.116 0.2643
D9 53165 186953.40828 0.284 0.7761
D10 63872 84809.909511 0.753 0.4514
D11 176038 132170.15205 1.332 0.1830
D12 185395 47856.351606 3.874 0.0001
D13 269360 53963.519721 4.992 0.0001
D14 253531 52610.070778 4.819 0.0001
D15 522853 35488.288020 14.733 0.0001
D16 438248 23549.964542 18.609 0.0001
D17 360450 95174.838916 3.787 0.0002
D18 359514 20212.132022 17.787 0.0001
D19 181924 32198.402156 5.650 0.0001
D20 448217 31387.420024 14.280 0.0001
D21 141326 51100.973832 2.766 0.0057
D22 1517565 58787.559400 25.814 0.0001
D23 105648 118655.45602 0.890 0.3733
D24 111490 137188.89034 0.813 0.4165
D25 461916 24836.270550 18.598 0.0001
D26 158290 71361.501685 2.218 0.0266
D27 106986 187537.82485 0.570 0.5684
D28 201958 177171.10866 1.140 0.2544
D29 155571 306446.43403 0.508 0.6117
D30 97762 216240.99343 0.452 0.6512
D31 269141 47543.270729 5.661 0.0001
D32 436165 59105.974699 7.379 0.0001
D33 273931 186953.40828 1.465 0.1429
D34 344477 83575.378561 4.122 0.0001
D35 189456 374345.55666 0.506 0.6128
D36 539492 88103.851500 6.123 0.0001
D37 96019 264495.49799 0.363 0.7166
D38 98775 115344.98071 0.856 0.3919
D39 76472 159553.47819 0.479 0.6318
D40 54381 167150.75712 0.325 0.7449
D41 80917 132247.74899 0.612 0.5407
D42 76326 264495.49799 0.289 0.7729
D43 70790 528577.10512 0.134 0.8935
D44 34167 373760.45541 0.091 0.9272
D45 50666 528577.10512 0.096 0.9236
D46 596630 132144.27628 4.515 0.0001
CCOF -200232 41843.411048 -4.785 0.0001
Model Fit: N R-square F Value
4249 0.3649 51.373
Table 5.14: Regression Results: Average Parcel Size
Dependent Variable is Parcel Size in Square Meters140
Variable Est. Parameter S.E. T-stat P-value
D1 1.303612 0.10129834 12.869 0.0001
D2 1.289601 0.05193603 24.831 0.0001
D3 1.298400 0.09979504 13.011 0.0001
D4 1.236957 0.12723336 9.722 0.0001
D5 1.386359 0.02709677 51.163 0.0001
D6 1.370700 0.01758000 77.969 0.0001
D7 1.331110 0.11995155 11.097 0.0001
D8 1.349868 0.05429301 24.863 0.0001
D9 1.209216 0.12723336 9.504 0.0001
D10 1.290669 0.05771839 22.361 0.0001
D11 1.417591 0.08994997 15.760 0.0001
D12 1.319684 0.03256921 40.519 0.0001
D13 1.303235 0.03672551 35.486 0.0001
D14 1.304027 0.03580441 36.421 0.0001
D15 1.384763 0.02415198 57.335 0.0001
D16 1.343035 0.01602721 83.797 0.0001
D17 1.333315 0.06477237 20.585 0.0001
D18 1.365128 0.01375561 99.242 0.0001
D19 1.386832 0.02191301 63.288 0.0001
D20 1.346791 0.02136108 63.049 0.0001
D21 1.316791 0.03477737 37.863 0.0001
D22 1.544303 0.04000857 38.599 0.0001
D23 1.420109 0.08075238 17.586 0.0001
D24 1.328814 0.09336553 14.232 0.0001
D25 1.348193 0.01690262 79.762 0.0001
D26 1.387535 0.04856592 28.570 0.0001
D27 1.385336 0.12763109 10.854 0.0001
D28 1.440554 0.12057590 11.947 0.0001
D29 1.407057 0.20855576 6.747 0.0001
D30 1.317722 0.14716538 8.954 0.0001
D31 1.336633 0.03235614 41.310 0.0001
D32 1.391484 0.04022527 34.592 0.0001
D33 1.238154 0.12723336 9.731 0.0001
D34 1.475369 0.05687822 25.939 0.0001
D35 1.400980 0.25476531 5.499 0.0001
D36 1.321930 0.05996012 22.047 0.0001
D37 1.301340 0.18000555 7.229 0.0001
D38 1.380913 0.07849940 17.591 0.0001
D39 1.398974 0.10858601 12.884 0.0001
D40 1.351258 0.11375643 11.879 0.0001
D41 1.289797 0.09000278 14.331 0.0001
D42 1.300952 0.18000555 7.227 0.0001
D43 1.275253 0.35972943 3.545 0.0004
D44 1.458458 0.25436712 5.734 0.0001
D45 1.129383 0.35972943 3.140 0.0017
D46 1.518809 0.08993236 16.888 0.0001
CCOF -0.076921 0.02847703 -2.701 0.0069
Model Fit: N R-square F Value
4249 0.9350 1286.196
Table 5.15: Regression Results: Parcel Shape
Dependent Variable Measures Deviation of Parcel Shape from a Circle141
Variable Est. Parameter S.E. T-stat P-value
D1 0.243714 0.02647772 9.204 0.0001
D2 0.202230 0.01357522 14.897 0.0001
D3 0.182396 0.02608478 6.992 0.0001
D4 0.244416 0.03325671 7.349 0.0001
D5 0.156617 0.00708265 22.113 0.0001
D6 0.159982 0.00459512 34.816 0.0001
D7 0.167402 0.03135336 5.339 0.0001
D8 0.174214 0.01419130 12.276 0.0001
D9 0.208824 0.03325671 6.279 0.0001
D10 0.222136 0.01508664 14.724 0.0001
D11 0.149982 0.02351144 6.379 0.0001
D12 0.129420 0.00851306 15.203 0.0001
D13 0.077115 0.00959945 8.033 0.0001
D14 0.106232 0.00935868 11.351 0.0001
D15 0.090940 0.00631293 14.405 0.0001
D16 0.084402 0.00418925 20.147 0.0001
D17 0.104455 0.01693043 6.170 0.0001
D18 0.097679 0.00359549 27.167 0.0001
D19 0.155530 0.00572770 27.154 0.0001
D20 0.080352 0.00558344 14.391 0.0001
D21 0.168596 0.00909023 18.547 0.0001
D22 0.061726 0.01045758 5.903 0.0001
D23 0.179122 0.02110734 8.486 0.0001
D24 0.202934 0.02440421 8.316 0.0001
D25 0.074428 0.00441807 16.846 0.0001
D26 0.159892 0.01269433 12.596 0.0001
D27 0.204744 0.03336067 6.137 0.0001
D28 0.172353 0.03151656 5.469 0.0001
D29 0.204196 0.05451305 3.746 0.0002
D30 0.257644 0.03846661 6.698 0.0001
D31 0.129716 0.00845736 15.338 0.0001
D32 0.102104 0.01051422 9.711 0.0001
D33 0.091146 0.03325671 2.741 0.0062
D34 0.097482 0.01486703 6.557 0.0001
D35 0.117993 0.06659146 1.772 0.0765
D36 0.066737 0.01567259 4.258 0.0001
D37 0.172306 0.04705049 3.662 0.0003
D38 0.182648 0.02051845 8.902 0.0001
D39 0.227989 0.02838260 8.033 0.0001
D40 0.170089 0.02973406 5.720 0.0001
D41 0.175602 0.02352525 7.464 0.0001
D42 0.191563 0.04705049 4.071 0.0001
D43 0.126105 0.09402736 1.341 0.1799
D44 0.264769 0.06648738 3.982 0.0001
D45 0.130954 0.09402736 1.393 0.1638
D46 0.167954 0.02350684 7.145 0.0001
CCOF 0.068700 0.00744343 9.230 0.0001
Model Fit: N R-square F Value
4249 0.6481 164.640
Table 5.16: Regression Results: Buffers on All Borders
Dependent Variable is Proportion of Land in Buffers142
Variable Est. Parameter S.E. T-stat P-value
D1 1.029947 0.02968151 34.700 0.0001
D2 0.990911 0.01521782 65.115 0.0001
D3 0.975659 0.02924102 33.366 0.0001
D4 1.023012 0.03728075 27.441 0.0001
D5 0.997586 0.00793965 125.646 0.0001
D6 0.997725 0.00515113 193.691 0.0001
D7 1.004384 0.03514710 28.577 0.0001
D8 1.011052 0.01590844 63.554 0.0001
D9 1.050407 0.03728075 28.176 0.0001
D10 1.002617 0.01691211 59.284 0.0001
D11 1.000678 0.02635631 37.967 0.0001
D12 0.997452 0.00954313 104.520 0.0001
D13 1.005423 0.01076097 93.432 0.0001
D14 0.996039 0.01049108 94.942 0.0001
D15 1.004405 0.00707679 141.929 0.0001
D16 0.996958 0.00469615 212.293 0.0001
D17 0.961489 0.01897900 50.661 0.0001
D18 1.000869 0.00403054 248.321 0.0001
D19 0.690084 0.00642075 107.477 0.0001
D20 1.001531 0.00625903 160.014 0.0001
D21 0.710642 0.01019015 69.738 0.0001
D22 0.998230 0.01172294 85.152 0.0001
D23 0.979059 0.02366132 41.378 0.0001
D24 0.909662 0.02735711 33.251 0.0001
D25 0.999057 0.00495265 201.722 0.0001
D26 1.013851 0.01423034 71.246 0.0001
D27 0.923318 0.03739729 24.689 0.0001
D28 0.987424 0.03533004 27.949 0.0001
D29 0.789046 0.06110909 12.912 0.0001
D30 0.908384 0.04312105 21.066 0.0001
D31 0.991698 0.00948070 104.602 0.0001
D32 1.001398 0.01178644 84.962 0.0001
D33 1.024350 0.03728075 27.477 0.0001
D34 1.000000 0.01666593 60.003 0.0001
D35 1.087236 0.07464899 14.565 0.0001
D36 1.002599 0.01756896 57.066 0.0001
D37 1.023575 0.05274357 19.407 0.0001
D38 1.000000 0.02300117 43.476 0.0001
D39 0.967918 0.03181688 30.422 0.0001
D40 1.000000 0.03333186 30.001 0.0001
D41 0.986131 0.02637179 37.393 0.0001
D42 0.920892 0.05274357 17.460 0.0001
D43 1.000000 0.10540461 9.487 0.0001
D44 1.000000 0.07453231 13.417 0.0001
D45 1.000000 0.10540461 9.487 0.0001
D46 0.193330 0.02635115 7.337 0.0001
CCOF -0.683570 0.00834408 -81.923 0.0001
Model Fit: N R-square F Value
4249 0.9881 7394.979
Table 5.17: Regression Results: Estimated Borders Buffered
Dependent Variable is Proportion of Borders where Buffers are Required143
Variable Est. Parameter S.E. T-stat P-value
D1 0.139145 0.02278985 6.106 0.0001
D2 0.154024 0.01168444 13.182 0.0001
D3 0.146953 0.02245164 6.545 0.0001
D4 0.216280 0.02862465 7.556 0.0001
D5 0.105246 0.00609617 17.264 0.0001
D6 0.115377 0.00395511 29.172 0.0001
D7 0.108643 0.02698641 4.026 0.0001
D8 0.123005 0.01221471 10.070 0.0001
D9 0.199683 0.02862465 6.976 0.0001
D10 0.179810 0.01298534 13.847 0.0001
D11 0.113668 0.02023672 5.617 0.0001
D12 0.102380 0.00732734 13.972 0.0001
D13 0.070033 0.00826242 8.476 0.0001
D14 0.093699 0.00805519 11.632 0.0001
D15 0.076056 0.00543365 13.997 0.0001
D16 0.069687 0.00360576 19.327 0.0001
D17 0.072214 0.01457233 4.956 0.0001
D18 0.078318 0.00309470 25.307 0.0001
D19 0.085225 0.00492993 17.287 0.0001
D20 0.068186 0.00480576 14.188 0.0001
D21 0.060681 0.00782413 7.756 0.0001
D22 0.036914 0.00900103 4.101 0.0001
D23 0.139673 0.01816747 7.688 0.0001
D24 0.152629 0.02100515 7.266 0.0001
D25 0.064367 0.00380271 16.927 0.0001
D26 0.135464 0.01092624 12.398 0.0001
D27 0.121076 0.02871413 4.217 0.0001
D28 0.126973 0.02712687 4.681 0.0001
D29 0.094491 0.04692036 2.014 0.0441
D30 0.139617 0.03310891 4.217 0.0001
D31 0.103400 0.00727940 14.204 0.0001
D32 0.081922 0.00904978 9.052 0.0001
D33 0.060001 0.02862465 2.096 0.0361
D34 0.071509 0.01279632 5.588 0.0001
D35 0.157517 0.05731648 2.748 0.0060
D36 0.063180 0.01348968 4.684 0.0001
D37 0.127556 0.04049721 3.150 0.0016
D38 0.060379 0.01766060 3.419 0.0006
D39 0.122111 0.02442942 4.999 0.0001
D40 0.088956 0.02559264 3.476 0.0005
D41 0.071339 0.02024860 3.523 0.0004
D42 0.053192 0.04049721 1.313 0.1891
D43 0.055670 0.08093105 0.688 0.4916
D44 0.089758 0.05722689 1.568 0.1169
D45 0.035313 0.08093105 0.436 0.6626
D46 0.027938 0.02023276 1.381 0.1674
CCOF -0.049050 0.00640669 -7.656 0.0001
Model Fit: N R-square F Value
4249 0.5381 104.138
Table 5.18: Regression Results: Estimated Proportion of Land in Buffers
Dependent Variable is Proportion of Land Lost to Mandatory Buffers144
Variable Est. Parameter S.E. T-stat P-value
D1 0.702438 0.07362976 9.540 0.0001
D2 0.789337 0.03775025 20.909 0.0001
D3 0.853608 0.07253707 11.768 0.0001
D4 0.922727 0.09248090 9.977 0.0001
D5 0.676121 0.01969557 34.329 0.0001
D6 0.734656 0.01277821 57.493 0.0001
D7 0.634825 0.08718804 7.281 0.0001
D8 0.751493 0.03946344 19.043 0.0001
D9 0.932002 0.09248090 10.078 0.0001
D10 0.830693 0.04195322 19.800 0.0001
D11 0.752480 0.06538108 11.509 0.0001
D12 0.813429 0.02367327 34.361 0.0001
D13 0.887956 0.02669433 33.264 0.0001
D14 0.892993 0.02602481 34.313 0.0001
D15 0.800642 0.01755512 45.607 0.0001
D16 0.822253 0.01164954 70.582 0.0001
D17 0.679677 0.04708047 14.436 0.0001
D18 0.811159 0.00999841 81.129 0.0001
D19 0.547061 0.01592770 34.346 0.0001
D20 0.849628 0.01552653 54.721 0.0001
D21 0.372741 0.02527830 14.746 0.0001
D22 0.674891 0.02908065 23.208 0.0001
D23 0.806595 0.05869571 13.742 0.0001
D24 0.775830 0.06786371 11.432 0.0001
D25 0.861573 0.01228585 70.127 0.0001
D26 0.864318 0.03530065 24.484 0.0001
D27 0.712153 0.09277000 7.677 0.0001
D28 0.825463 0.08764186 9.419 0.0001
D29 0.640491 0.15159094 4.225 0.0001
D30 0.663541 0.10696870 6.203 0.0001
D31 0.815007 0.02351840 34.654 0.0001
D32 0.781910 0.02923816 26.743 0.0001
D33 0.582971 0.09248090 6.304 0.0001
D34 0.770749 0.04134253 18.643 0.0001
D35 0.980857 0.18517884 5.297 0.0001
D36 0.881151 0.04358264 20.218 0.0001
D37 0.714529 0.13083892 5.461 0.0001
D38 0.345326 0.05705811 6.052 0.0001
D39 0.563847 0.07892688 7.144 0.0001
D40 0.513923 0.08268506 6.215 0.0001
D41 0.375763 0.06541946 5.744 0.0001
D42 0.308835 0.13083892 2.360 0.0183
D43 0.441456 0.26147311 1.688 0.0914
D44 0.269236 0.18488941 1.456 0.1454
D45 0.269661 0.26147311 1.031 0.3025
D46 0.199318 0.06536828 3.049 0.0023
CCOF -0.460736 0.02069883 -22.259 0.0001
Model Fit: N R-square F Value
4249 0.8962 771.671
Table 5.19: Regression Results: Estimated Proportion of Potential Buffers Land in Buffers
Dependent Variable is Land in Buffers / Land within Buffer Distance of Border145
Chapter 6
Conclusions
The impacts of distance-dependent spatial externalities have been the focus of previous
theoretical and empirical analysis. Twoimportant features of this class of externalities have
been unrecognized in previous work. The ﬁrst is the spatially dynamic location incentives
that theycreate. Thisthesis demonstrates that edge-effect externalities inﬂuence theoptimal
location of an affected land user. Speciﬁcally, the impacted land user will locate an optimal
distance from the generator of the externality. The second previously unrecognized feature
of edge-effect externalities is the inﬂuence of the arrangement of land uses on the poten-
tial productivity of the economic landscape. Under edge-effect externalities, the production
possibilities frontier is potentially non-convex with respect to the arrangement of land uses.
Holding the allocation of land uses ﬁxed, the productivity of the economic landscape will
increase as the fragmentation of land uses decreases. These positive returns to spatial scale
imply potential positive externalities between impacted land users. When grouped together,146
they provide mutual beneﬁts through shared borders where no externality damage occurs.
These two previously unrecognized features of edge-effect externalities lead to the central
question addressed in this dissertation: what impact will spatially dynamic incentives have
on the efﬁciency of equilibrium landscape patterns?
Non-convexities duetoedge-effect externalities canbeillustrated withaone-dimensional
model, but full implications are only apparent in two dimensions, mandating a two- new-
line dimensional modeling approach. Astrictly analytical two-dimensional model wouldbe
very difﬁcult to solve due toa high degree ofspatial interdependencies, since at aminimum,
the choices of one land user depend also on the choices of that land user’s four contiguous
neighbors. Further, ideally, atwo-dimensional theoretical modelshouldbeamenable totest-
ing using real-world data. A model designed for calibration using two-dimensional G.I.S.
data would ideally have the same spatial structure as the data in terms of number of parcels
in the landscape. With increasing availability of high-resolution remotely sensed land use
data, highly disaggregated data on land-use will become the rule rather than the exception.
In combination, the large number of land uses, high degree of spatial interdependency, and
potential for non-convexities make strictly analytical models highly impractical for disag-
gregated, two-dimensional land use models.
The alternative modeling approach taken in Chapter 4 bypasses these computational
difﬁculties, since an economic equilibrium is reached through the uncoordinated interac-
tions of individual agents. The model thus directly expresses the classic “invisible hand”
metaphor used to describe evolution towards an economic equilibrium. In this dissertation,147
the two-dimensional model is used to generate a set of stylized predictions which are tested
indirectly using empirical data. Even this simple, stylized model, however, illustrates a se-
ries of outcomes which would have been very difﬁcult to generate using a purely analytical
modelwithansetofimposedequilibrium conditions. Further, itfacilitates analysisfocusing
on free-market, rather than socially optimal, outcomes. It demonstrates the key point that
the incentives created by edge-effect externalities are not necessarily sufﬁcient to result in
efﬁcient patterns of production. In many cases, welfare improving rearrangements of land
uses are possible in free-market equilibrium landscapes. Therefore, it illustrates that inefﬁ-
cient patterns of land use are a previously unrecognized dimension to market failure under
edge-effect externalities. This result strengthens the rationale for policies such as zoning
rules and buffer zone regulations which may encourage development of efﬁcient economic
landscapes.
Further, the model illustrates the impact that edge-effect externalities will have on a tra-
ditional Von Thunen landscape. Where beneﬁts from externality avoidance exceed beneﬁts
from lower transportation costs, edge-effect externalities encourage development of locally
more compact and geographically more dispersed production landscapes. Therefore, these
spatial externalities provide anexplanation fordispersal ofeconomic activity in space. This
result may explain fragmented patterns of development often seen at the edges of cities.
Theoretical predictions are tested through a cross-sectional analysis of production pat-
terns of certiﬁed organic and comparable non-certiﬁed organic agricultural parcels. While
some analysis is done of whole-landscape impacts of edge-effect externalities, the primary148
focus of this empirical analysis is on externality avoidance at the level of an individual or-
ganic producer. Thegoals ofthis empirical analysis are two-fold. Theﬁrstistodemonstrate
that certiﬁed organic parcels differfromnon-organic parcels inwaysthat are consistent with
avoidance of negative spillovers from incompatible land uses. The second goal is to illus-
trate a series of spatial statistics, measurable at the individual parcel level, which are appro-
priate for inclusion in a more general statistical model of the probability of ﬁnding a parcel
in a particular land use. These variables on parcel size, shape, and neighboring land use
could enhance the explanatory power of any model of land uses where distance-dependent
externalities are economically important.
Results strongly support hypotheses regarding differences between C.C.O.F. and non-
C.C.O.F. parcels in terms of their losses of production land to mandatory buffer zones.
C.C.O.F. parcels in general have a more compact shape than non-C.C.O.F. parcels, imply-
ing that C.C.O.F. parcels would potentially lose a lower proportion of land to buffer zones
than a less compact non-C.C.O.F. parcel of the same area. However, C.C.O.F. parcels are
much smaller than non-C.C.O.F. parcels, leaving them more vulnerable to losses in this di-
mension. Insum, the C.C.O.F.parcels are inherently more vulnerable to buffer zones losses
than non-C.C.O.F. parcels.
Even given this inherent higher level of vulnerability to losses of land to mandatory
buffers, estimates of buffer zone losses using surrounding land uses as a proxy for the re-
quirement of buffer zones demonstrate that C.C.O.F. parcels lose a signiﬁcantly lower pro-
portion of land to mandatory buffer than would non-C.C.O.F.parcels. This isdue to the fact149
that these parcels are much more likely to share a border with a compatible land use – both
other organic farms and undeveloped land – than non-C.C.O.F. parcels. The short lesson
from this analysis is that protection from edge-effect externalities is an important factor for
success of certiﬁed organic farms.
This dissertation has demonstrated several key results regarding the impact of spatially
heterogeneous externalities on patterns of economic activity. Yet, perhaps the broader goal
of the dissertation has been to demonstrate the possibilities of new modeling approaches.
This dissertation does not achieve the ultimate goal of developing a full-scale theoretical
model and calibrating this model using real-world data. However, by developing basic me-
chanics of the theoretical model, and by developing theoretically motivated spatial statis-
tics which can be calculated using G.I.S. technology, the dissertation provides the building
blocks for development of a full-scale model.
It is important to note that the models developed in this dissertation rely on new and
evolving technological tools – the sophisticated and ﬂexible programming environment of
Mathematica, and the tremendous spatial data analysis capabilities of Geographic Informa-
tion Systems. New technologies loosen previous constraints on the scope and types of mod-
els that scientists can build. By providing new tools, these technologies challenge our col-
lective imagination to expand the limits of ourmodeling paradigm. Hopefully, this disserta-
tion has demonstrated some small ways in which our modeling paradigm can be expanded
while still relying on the frameworks and insights developed by previous methodologies.150
Appendix A
Production Spatial Dynamics
In terms of mathematical structure, the model presented in Chpater 2 is equivalent to
a temporally dynamic model in which a decision maker chooses optimal switching points
between activities. Because of this mathematical structure, describing changes in produc-
tion technology due to changes in parameters is somewhat more complex than in a static
problem and follows the same mathematical approach taken when examining a temporally
dynamic problem.






















































































































The result is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
































. This represents the net marginal productivity gained















. This represents the productivity gain from moving C’s
border oneunit awayfromO’sborder, holding O’slocation ﬁxed. Thus,the netproductivity

































￿ . The result is illstrated in Figure 2.5.152
Appendix B
A Competitive Equilibrium Example
Using a set of simple functional formsconsistent with the assumptions of the model and
asetofarbitrary parameter values, anumerical solutiontothecompetitive equilibrium prob-
lem presented in Chapter 2 is outlined.
C’s supply decision: As a speciﬁc example, assume that C’s marginal productivity de-






































































































































































for any scale of production for A.
O’s supply decision: Using the linear form of the externality deﬁned in equation 2.5, O’s












































































































































and that the Hessian of
￿
with respect to the three goods is a negative deﬁnite matrix.

















































































Asaspeciﬁcexample, lettheconsumerhaveCobb-Douglass preferences overconsump-






















































Using the explicit functional forms described above, equations B.20, B.21, B.22, B.3
2.13, B.7, B.14, B.15, B.16andthe constraints onland-use location fromequation 2.7can155



























































































































































































































































































￿ . Recall that the kink in O’s production function
is determined by C’s location, so
￿
￿



















































































































































































































































































































Note that I am assuming that input demands equal input supplies.







































































































































































￿ from above, and use these solutions to ﬁnd market clearing inputs and outputs.







































































































. Again, from equations







An Empirical Land-use Model
Equation C.1 describes hypothesized empirical determinants of the probability of ﬁnd-
ingaparticular parcel incertiﬁed organic production. Because output price andcostdata are
notincluded, thisspeciﬁcation could beviewed astaking theproportion oflandasorganicin
the particular region as given. This model contains several innovations as compared to sim-
ilar models present in the literature. The ﬁrst is the inclusion of the length of borders shared
with neighboring parcels in organic and compatible land uses. The second is the inclusion
of parcel size and a parcel shape index. These innovations represent potential inﬂuences of
edge-effect externalities on the attractiveness of a particular parcel for organic farming.
























































































































































































































































































































































￿ First-order spatial autocorrelation parameter
￿
￿ Total length of shared border with non-organic protective land uses
￿
￿ Parametric inﬂuence of protective land uses
￿
￿ Vector of parcel area and shape index
￿
￿ Parametric inﬂuences of parcel area and shape
￿
￿ Vector of impedence-weighted road distances to markets
￿
￿ Parametric inﬂuence of transport costs
￿
￿ Vector of soil class dummies
￿
￿ Parametric inﬂuence of soil classes
￿
￿ Vector of crop type dummies
￿

















￿ Parametric ﬁrst-order lagged error inﬂuence
This model is speciﬁed with only ﬁrst-order spatial lags. The underlying assumption
is that only immediate neighbors matter. The appropriate number of spatial lags could es-
tablished through tests for spatial autocorrelation
￿





￿ are equal, or equivalently that the inﬂuence of any organic neighbor on the probability
￿





￿ with values of one for all contiguous neighbors and zero otherwise.161










duce to a single variable reﬂecting the length of border shared with another organic farm. It
is important to note, however, that the model would still be spatially autoregressive, since
dependent variables serve as explanatory variables.





￿ are equal. These parameters would reﬂect
spatial correlation between parcels not accounted for by the spatially lagged dependent and
the independent variables. They may represent the inﬂuence of variables not accounted for
in the speciﬁcation, such as local strength of demand for organic produce, or geographic
conditions such as land topography.
This speciﬁcation allows for the possibility that the inﬂuence of an organic neighboring





, the hypothesis of neighborhood effects for organic growers
beyond the beneﬁts of protection from externalities would be supported. As discussed in
Chapter 5, these impacts could include such factors as beneﬁts from shared knowledge and
technology.162
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